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Abstract: This research aims to identify a set of generative mechanisms which are shared by 
business schools’ process of development in their search for strategic comparative advantage. We 
use a processual approach (Pettigrew, 1997) based on two detailed historical studies supported by 
unexplored archival data and interviews: the case of the Saïd Business School at the University of 
Oxford and the case of the Judge Business School at the University of Cambridge (1990s – 2000s). 
Preliminary results indicate a complex process of emergence, development and institutionalisation 
which was neither a conscious desire expressed by existing academic institutions nor the result of a 
clear vision provided by academic leaders at the time. This research confirms Weick’s idea that 
business schools are loose couple systems that do not systematically express plans and intentional 
selection of means that get them to agree upon goals set a priori (Weick, 1976). Last but not least, 
our research shows that the nature of business schools’ organisational change combines a series of 
exogenous and endogenous generative mechanisms, through disjointed clusters of events. It is from 
this combination of exogenous and endogenous generative mechanisms inherited from the past that 
future business schools’ strategies might be considered.  
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Introduction 
 
In the 1960s, American graduate schools of business administration constituted a reference model 
in terms of management education for several European universities. American business education 
inspired the British system which was soon to develop various institutions, promoting business 
studies at the university level. These developments sparked off a controversy over the legitimacy of 
university involvement in management education and led the whole subject to become a matter for 
public debate. An increasing number of British businessmen gathered to establish the Foundation 
for Management Education (FME)1. Far from impressed by the FME’s developments, some other 
industrialists, met informally at the Savoy Hotel in London to work on the creation of a “British 
Harvard”2 calling themselves the Savoy Group (Whitley, Thomas, Marceau, 1981: 44). These 
establishments were soon followed by the creation in 1961 of the National Economic Development 
Council (NEDC) to reconcile trade-unions, industry, and government, as a response to England’s 
economic and social decline (Locke, 1996: 46). Two years after its creation, this Council reported 
the need for “at least one very high-level new school or institute, along the lines of the Harvard 
Business School, or the School of Industrial Management at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology” (NEDC report, 1963: 5-6). From this conclusion, the FME, the Savoy Group and the 
NEDC appointed a Committee, led by Lord Franks, which sought to provide detailed 
recommendations about the implementation of these new schools of business in the UK. Lord 
Franks’ enquiry was made easier by the conclusions drawn from the Robbins report a month earlier, 
which suggested that “two major post-graduate schools should be built up in addition to other 
developments already probable in universities and other institutions” (Robbins, 1963: 65).  
 
Almost twenty years later, there was sizeable growth throughout Britain’s business education sector, 
but various unresolved problems remained. The emergence of the Management Charter Initiative in 
1988, as a result of negotiations between industry and the Government, expressed the construction 
of “a system of qualifications on the basis of what industry wanted and felt to be most consistent 
with its actual needs” (Tiratsoo, 1999: 121). This system was not particularly well received among 
the academic management community and, overall, “some long-standing weaknesses were still very 
much in evidence” (Ibid: 122): the MBA format was perceived as too theoretical and very few 
business schools in the UK achieved international excellence.      
 
This short history of management education in the UK provides insights into a range of issues. It 
shows how, with respect to management studies, Britain stood as an exception, how controversial 
the process of development and the institutionalisation of business schools in the country have been 
and how it is only recently that business schools have found legitimacy in the academic world. The 
role of management education in the selection of future managers and in the professional training of 
leaders has had – and still has – a tremendous societal impact. As a result, trajectories used by 
business schools to reach a high status within the academic and the industrial community 
constitutes a key issue, not only concerned with the business education sector but regarding the 
country’s economic system as a whole. Despite the recent and disjointed process of emergence of 
management education, the United Kingdom has succeeded in founding the two of the most 
prestigious business schools in the world; namely the Saïd Business School (SBS) at the University 
of Oxford and the Judge Business School (JBS) at the University of Cambridge3.  
 
                                                 
1 The FME financed the establishment of London and Manchester Business School, a few years later. The FME still 
exists and seeks to encourage business leaders to make the transition between the private sector and business school 
academia. For further details on this institution: http://management-education.org.uk 
2 The members of the Savoy Group differed from the FME’s work, mainly because their main idea was in favour of the 
need for a ‘completely new type of college which would be tailor-made to fit industry’s requirements’, created 
independently from any existing structures (Whitley, Thomas, Marceau, 1981: 44). 
3 Respectively ranked 2nd and 1st in the UK for their MBA programmes (Financial Times Global MBA Rankings 2010). 
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This paper seeks to better understand the key factors, which lead some business schools to 
encounter better success than others. Various scholars in business history argue that reputation and 
social capital are both significant factors in this search for success, claiming that “even if the 
content of a particular educational programme is excellent, it will not be able to play a significant 
role as long as the potential students and employers of the graduates do not realize its excellence” 
(Engwall, Zamagni, 1998: 2). Obviously, it could not be denied that reputation-related issues play a 
central role in the emergence, the development and the strategy of business schools. Yet, our 
contribution goes beyond this statement and stresses the deep causes underlying management 
education dynamics. Our analysis is supported by the exploration of two case-studies from a 
historical perspective: the SBS and the JBS. More generally, beyond their reputation, this 
contribution shows that the current status of the SBS and the JBS is neither a conscious desire to 
acquire business studies expressed by the University administration, nor the result of a clear vision 
provided by academic leaders of the time. Rather, this paper demonstrates that management 
education at Oxford and Cambridge emerged from a combination of muddle, confusion, personal 
antagonism, vested interests, Oxford and Cambridge’s ways of building new disciplines on existing 
ones, shortage of academic staff in management, and inherited ambivalence about vocational 
education. It is argued that management education in both Universities was an unintended ironic 
consequence of these factors, and that this explains the lateness, the peculiar structure, and the 
multidisciplinary orientation expressed by both Schools’ current status. Consequently, both case 
studies illustrate that business schools are considered as loose couple systems (Weick, 1976). 
Overall, the aim of this work is to identify a set of hidden generative mechanisms which are shared 
by both business schools’ process of development which lead them to the competitive status they 
have today. 
 
The paper falls into three parts. The first part of the paper introduces the theoretical framework of 
our work, and the methods used to identify a set of hidden generative mechanisms. The second part 
of our contribution offers an in-depth processual analysis of the two-case studies selected for our 
research. Last but not least, the third section aims to discuss early results, especially through the 
identification of similar patterns in the respective development process of the SBS and of the JBS.       
 
I. Theoretical Framework and Methods 
I.1. Theoretical Framework 
 
Existing contributions to the management education literature are often concerned with highlighting 
the weaknesses of the way business knowledge is delivered in business schools (Pfeffer, Fong, 
2004) – from both a practical (Mintzberg, 2004) and an ethical (Birnik, Billsberry, 2007) point of 
view. Some scholars try to understand the place of business schools and their added-value to the 
economic and societal system (Locke, 1996), others seek to evaluate the gap between theory and 
practice (Pearce, 2004) and few others admit that this place, although not yet understood, still 
makes management scholars “hugely successful” while showing “no real signs of failing to be so” 
(Spender, 2005: 1285). Our work aims to identify a set of generative mechanisms in the 
institutionalisation and the legitimacy of business schools.  
 
To this end, our contribution aims to apply some strategic management concepts to management 
education issues. The identification of these key factors requires a contextual knowledge which can 
be found in the business history literature as well as a more general knowledge of strategic 
management tools used in organisations. As Pfeffer and Fong would argue (2004: 1510), 
“explaining how business schools have arrived in their present predicament is undoubtedly a 
complex process and there are many and varied causes”. Indeed, while as for any other 
organisations, there is not one best way to develop a business school; yet, we believe that there are 
some shared organisational characteristics in this path. Ironically though, universities are still not 
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well understood as organisations (Bess, 1984; Cohen, March, 1974) and as rightly pointed out by 
Gray (1996: 125), the irony is reinforced by the fact that “though university teachers have played an 
important part in the development of management training in commerce, industry and the public 
service, universities have been almost wilfully neglectful of management development (…)”. In 
particular, while a very large set of different organisations are studied in the management literature, 
business schools have been neglected. Only a minority of articles identify strategic options for 
business schools organisations (Pfeffer, Fong, 2004; Friga, Bettis, Sullivan, 2003; Cummings, 1990; 
Harrigan, 1990), even though it is agreed that business schools constitute one of the areas of 
greatest growth in universities over the past fifty years (Friga et al., 2003: 233). The study of 
business schools’ emergence, development and future strategies, therefore, constitute a relevant area 
of interest which justifies the particular attention given to it in this paper. Hence, our paper 
constitutes a first step towards the construction of an adequate theory of organisation applicable to 
business schools. 
 
The general view defended in this article is that the evolution of business schools is not mainly a 
smooth process which results from vested interests, contextual factors and institutional history. On 
the contrary, we argue that business schools’ trajectories of evolution follow a complex dynamics 
which is governed by both exogenous and endogenous forces. On the one hand, the economic 
context has a strong impact on business schools’ orientation at a theoretical and an empirical level. 
The growing need for management training expressed by the industrial sector is a key to 
understanding business education in the UK. However, we do not believe that business schools are 
systems which are exclusively governed by exogenous forces. Rather, we argue that unintended 
consequences and contextual factors also play a significant role as endogenous forces to business 
schools’ dynamics of evolution.     
 
However, to a large extent, business schools are organisations which differ from more traditional 
organisational forms. Firstly, the emergence of these schools on the market of business education 
rarely results from the ideas of one man, but is rather the consequence of a slow institutional 
process of negotiation formed by a collective or a collegiate decision within the University and 
between different stakeholders, seen as an expanding set of players (Pfeffer, Fong, 2004: 1511). 
Business schools evolve within the institutional context of a university and are often casted as cash-
cow used to cross-subsidize less viable departments on campus which also requires business 
schools’ leaders “to protect the financial interests of the school whilst acting as responsible citizen 
in university governance” (Bolton, 1996: 494).  
 
Secondly and in relation to the first characteristic, innovations within business schools are not as 
frequent as in a private business, since it is argued that “forces for change are frequently distrusted 
and seen as threats to successful, effective patterns of faculty interaction and self-interest” 
(Cummings, 1990: 695). Resisting change related issues within university departments is largely 
stressed in the literature and often seen as the result of “a greater inbuilt organisational conservatism 
(some would claim it to be inertia) than almost any other kind of organisation” (Gray, 1989: 124).  
 
Thirdly, since business schools rely on ideas such as “competition, growth, and return on 
investment as they think about their role and strategy” and tend not to see education “as a 
mechanism for socializing and educating the young” (Pfeffer, Fong, 2004: 1510)”, they should 
express very much concern for looming changes in the environment in which they operate (Porter, 
McKibbin, 1988: 311). Hence, management of organisational change also seems to be a critical 
issue in the development of business schools. That is; on the one hand, accountability for the use of 
public money by business schools is required and, on the other, their need for sustainability by 
generating new sources of income for the university as a whole also matters.  
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Last but not least, leadership roles in a business school (and, more generally, in a University) are 
often considered to be “difficult to carry out successfully”, since “unlike in industry, to hold a 
senior management position is not normally a leading goal”, as academics are instead motivated by 
“the intellectual challenge of making new contribution to knowledge” (Bolton, 1996: 491).  
 
Overall, this paper follows Karl Weick’s idea arguing that business schools take the form of loose 
coupling organisations that do not systematically express “plans, intentional selection of means that 
get the organisation to agree upon goals, and all of this is accomplished by such rationalized 
procedures as cost-benefit analyses, division of labor, specified areas of discretion, authority 
invested in the office, job descriptions, and a consistent evaluation and reward system” and are 
therefore proven intractable to analysis through rational assumptions (Weick, 1976: 1). Rather, 
business schools convey the image of a set of unexpected properties of “less rationalized and less 
tightly clusters of events” (Ibid.: 3)4.  
 
It is this substantial unexplained remainder – set of unexpected properties and generative 
mechanisms – that is the focus of this paper. In the next section, the main methods used to answer 
the research question are introduced and discussed.    
 
I.2. Methods 
 
This paper uses a comparative case study for theory building (Eisenhardt, 1989) with an 
investigation on the case of the SBS at the University of Oxford and the case of the JBS at the 
University of Cambridge. The aim is to inductively understand their developmental and 
institutionalisation processes. In accordance to the theoretical framework discussed above, a 
particular attention is given to the hidden generative mechanisms that have influenced these 
processes. The SBS and the JBS were particularly ideal sites to compare and draw lessons about 
business education in the UK and to explore their patterns of emergence, institutionalisation and 
current strategies. 
 
Comparative case study research usually tend towards a choice of “polar type”, i.e. theoretical 
sampling with extreme and opposite samples to facilitate the researcher’s observation of contrasting 
patterns in the data (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). On the contrary, in this study we have chosen 
two apparently similar cases (SBS and JBS) and have observed the dynamics underlying the 
emergence and institutionalisation of each of these two business schools. As emphasised by the 
research conducted by Garnsey and Lawton Smith (1998) or Garnsey and Longhi (2004), the 
comparative case study of two cases that are often categorised together (such as Oxbridge) - and 
therefore apparently similar- particularly favours the investigation and the process of sorting out the 
similarities and differences of each developmental process, and enhance the capacity to provide 
conceptual tools for coherent comparison.  
 
In addition, the comparative study of SBS and JBS seemed particularly well suited to avoid cultural 
bias as well as size bias. SBS and JBS are both located in the UK and constitute the two most 
competitive business schools in the country (ranked respectively 2nd and 1st in the UK for their 
                                                 
4 A more detailed definition of loosely couple system could be read as follows: “By loose coupling, the author 
[Glassman, 1973] intends to convey the image that coupled events are responsive, but that each event also preserves its 
own identity and some evidence of its physical or logical separateness. Thus, in the case of an educational organisation, 
it may be the case that the counselor's office is loosely coupled to the principal's office. The image is that the principal 
and the counselor are somehow attached, but that each retains some identity and separateness and that their attachment 
may be circumscribed, infrequent, weak in its mutual affects, unimportant, and/or slow to respond. Each of those 
connotations would be conveyed if the qualifier loosely were attached to the word coupled. Loose coupling also carries 
connotations of impermanence, dissolvability, and tacitness all of which are potentially crucial properties of the "glue" 
that holds organisations together” (Weick, 1976: 3).  
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MBA programme5) and are perhaps two of the most prestigious in the world. This allows studying 
the emergence and success of two business schools that are similar in their reputation but that have 
emerged in different locations. Although they emerged in different locations, both schools are of the 
same national tradition, avoiding bias related to the country’s level of education, wealth, social 
specificities or culture. Moreover, the contextual aspect of the two cases is particularly important: 
both schools proved to have the same general way of functioning (colleges system, same 
hierarchical organisation etc.) and foster the same rituals (such as formal dinning in colleges, the 
mayballs, the structure of honours degrees divided in “tripos” etc.). All these characteristics play a 
central role in both business schools and in their institutional maintenance (Tracey, 2010), from 
which a specific jargon have derived overtime6. These two schools are thus endowed with a specific 
contextual and cultural background that has facilitated a more rigorous and accurate comparison. 
Both schools are also similar in size: they are part of universities with on average the same number 
of students. In 2010: around 20 000 students are studying at the University of Oxford (including 
11,766 undergraduates and 8,701 postgraduates) and 28,776 students at the University of 
Cambridge (including 18,183 undergraduates and 10,593 postgraduates). They also obviously 
exhibit a very strong scientific tradition deriving from the two historical Universities to which they 
belong. Indeed, SBS and JBS provided us with cases presenting a very rich history of development: 
over 800 years of University history (both universities were founded respectively in the 12th and 
13th century) and have experienced several attempts to develop Management Studies (MS) within 
the University. 
 
Given the aim of our paper and the rich case data, we have chosen to adopt a processual approach 
(Pettigrew, 1997; Langley 1999, 2007; Van de Ven and Poole, 2005; Musca, 2006). In fact, the 
exploration of hidden generative mechanisms that have influenced the developmental and 
institutionalisation processes of SBS and JBS involves considering how they “come to be 
constituted, reproduced, adapted and defined through ongoing processes” or “organisational 
becoming” (Tsoukas and Chia 2002, Langley, 2007). As the role of context and time in both cases 
is particularly important, we think that investigating the complex process steps accounting for the 
current results, hold promises for a more complete understanding of the emergence of successful 
business schools. As emphasised by Pettigrew (1997: 347), the processual approach enables us to 
explore “human conduct and organisational life and to embed such dynamics over time in the 
various layers of context in which streams of activity occur”. On the contrary, most traditional 
approaches (especially variance theories e.g. Mohr, 1982) provide only partial pictures of the 
phenomena and ignore the non-linear effects of action under complexity and evacuate the role of 
time (Tsoukas and Hatch, 2001). Precisely, for the cases we investigate, what is interesting is the 
temporally embedded accounts that would allow to understand how the two schools come to be 
what they are and identify patterns giving insights into their processes of emergence and 
institutionalisation.  
 
To this purpose, one of the main ways to develop a processual approach is to invest in historical 
studies on the two organisations to understand the organisational actions, events and conditions that 
generated patterns in the present, and trace the processes by which they arrived at their current 
positions (Langley, 2007). However, the aim of this research is not to provide a case history but a 
case study that would finally generate contribution for those who seek guidance on how two 
performing business schools have emerged and what are the favourable or unfavourable features 
identified that could help to understand this process of emergence. Pettigrew suggests “the case 
study goes beyond the case history in attempting a range of analytical purposes. Firstly there is a 
search for patterns in the process and presumably some attempt to compare the shape, character and 
incidence of this pattern in case A compared with case B. Secondly, there is a quest to find the 
                                                 
5 Source Financial Times Global MBA Rankings 2010 
6 For further details about this jargon, see Table of “Abbreviations and brief glossary of the Oxbridge jargon” located at 
the end of the contribution.  
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underlying mechanisms which shape any patterning in the observed processes.” (Pettigrew, 1997: 
339). We followed this established research practice to conduct our data collection and analysis. 
 
The paper relies on two main sources for both business schools. The first is interviews with 
academic fellows who participated in, or at least witnessed, the emergence and the development of 
Business Studies in Oxford or in Cambridge. Copies of unpublished papers dealing with the theory 
of the firm and of industry were also used. The second source is archival data. These archival data 
took three forms: first, documents related to the introduction of Business Studies in Oxford or in 
Cambridge, held in the Bodleian Library archives or Marshall Library archives and specific 
newspapers such as the “Oxford University Gazette” and the “Cambridge University Reporter”. 
Second, documents on the theoretical content of the first courses taught in Management through an 
analysis of tripos (examinations for the BA degree with honours) and the list of lectures proposed 
by the Board of the Faculty. And third, examination questions addressed to Economics and 
Management students, as well as examination decrees and regulations. These multiple data 
collection and analysis methods made possible a triangulation, which gives the case a stronger 
substantiation of the constructs.  
 
To begin with, we wrote an analytical chronology of the research setting so as to have an important 
point of reference for progress and pattern recognition (Pettigrew, 1997). This is the reason why we 
started with analysing within case data through a temporally embedded account for each school. 
Then, coupled with the within case analysis we conducted a cross-case search for patterns 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
II. The Oxbridge context of management education from a historical perspective 
 
This paper argues that the organisational context does significantly matter in the emergence and 
development of organisations; yet, arguing that some similar organisational philosophies can be 
seen as unintended consequences of this emergence and development. This section constitutes a 
temporally embedded account, which illustrates development trajectories of both business schools 
in the UK, in order to identify similar patterns in part III of the paper. This section starts the 
analysis in the 1900s, since this is when the first evidence exists that business studies was needed at 
Oxford (although the first Oxford Business Diploma failed to be introduced in 1913). At Cambridge, 
the early 1900s correspond to Alfred Marshall’s developments of industrial and business 
organisation, which particularly argued for the need of management education at the University 
level. From this time, the section falls into three main sub-sections, structured chronologically. The 
first part covers the first part of the twentieth century and stresses the early (failed) initiatives 
related to the introduction of management education in Oxford and Cambridge. Then, in a second 
part, we depict the gradual acceptance for business education in both business schools which covers 
1950-1980. The third and last part focuses on the institutionalisation of both business schools which 
became the current Saïd and Judge Business Schools.     
 
II.1. The Oxbridge intransigence regarding management education (1900s – 1950s): Early 
initiatives and their failures 
 
Academics in the nineteenth and the early twentieth century were far from considering business as 
noble enough to be taught at British Universities. It is often argued that this was mainly due to the 
lack of interest displayed by businessmen in recruiting undergraduate or graduate candidates. For 
instance, in 1914 Sir Herbert Morgan, a wealthy English businessman knighted in 1917, claimed 
that “[…] if a man has to make business his career, to make his own way in life, I should strongly 
urge in probably the majority of cases, that he enter the office direct from school” (Morgan, 1914: 
64-65). This personal statement illustrates a more general trend of the time, in which only few 
businessmen saw an advantage in recruiting their staff from higher schools of education. Thus, the 
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lack of interest in Business Studies as a worthwhile academic discipline was partially caused by 
industrialists’ failure to realise that a University degree could provide its possessor with useful 
skills to apply to managerial practice. The rejection of Business Studies as a worthwhile academic 
discipline did not only come from the side of business but also from the attitude of University 
functionalities. They considered business to be a vulgar and ignoble profession. This remark is 
especially true in the context of Oxford and Cambridge Universities and this is what the following 
account seeks to illustrate.  
 
- The unsuccessful attempts to get business training programmes in Oxford University 
Interestingly, the first potential Oxford Business Diploma failed to be introduced in 1913. One year 
earlier, the suggestion of a substantial two years course aimed at training students for business 
careers made by the University Chancellor, Lord Curzon7, was rejected in November 1913 by the 
Convocation8 (Brock, Curthoys, 2000: 613). To a large extent, this was due to the general view then 
shared by Oxford academics on business education at Oxford. In the Congregation debate, this 
common view was well expressed by the Warden of New College, Dr. Spooner9, who pleaded 
against “too much of the brains and vigour of the country” being attracted towards the “wealth-
amassing career of commerce or business” to the neglect of “the more ennobling careers of the 
clergyman (…), the lawyer, the doctor, and even the public servant” (Snow, 1991: 16). 
Alternatively, it is possible to interpret this statement on the basis of a purely institutional reason, 
underlying the fear that students would be attracted away from the Diploma in Economics and 
Political Science which had been recently introduced in 1909. Oxford disliked proposed courses 
“that encroached on established vested interests” (Brock, Curthoys, 2000: 613). In addition to the 
high degree of competition for students, the importance of vested interests at Oxford also suggests a 
lack of resources able to establish a proper Management degree at the University level. 
 
Moreover, the vocational nature of business education fuelled the debate about the merits of 
establishing it as an academic discipline. Prejudice existed against business education at Oxford 
(Chester, 1986: 24). Here, it could be argued that the denunciation of the principle of vocationalism 
mainly resulted from the transmission of the British cultural heritage of the Victorian period. 
Oxford dons were more concerned to preserve this heritage than to help the University to keep 
ahead of its competitors10. Then, to that extent, the danger of establishing business education at 
Oxford was that it might “bring young men to Oxford merely to follow a technical preparation for 
business” (Oxford Magazine, 22: 176). Until the First World War, although the Oxford University 
Appointments Committee was preoccupied with the integration of students into businesses, it 
seemed very difficult to establish a business training program for young men in the Oxford context; 
that is, Oxford had no particular hostility to business, but did not consider it an academic discipline. 
To some extent, according to Morgan, Oxford was developing “an astonishing and profound 
ignorance of all that business means”, preserving a very “detached and theoretical outlook” in its 
studies of trade and business (Morgan, 1914: 72-74). Before the Great War, trade and business or 
even economics were not studied inside the University. It was only in 1909 that the first Diploma in 
Economics and Political Science was introduced, still depending on the Schools of Literae 
Humaniores and Modern History. In 1920, this lead to the creation of the Honour School of 
Philosophy, Politics and Economics. Even then, the content of the lectures was very much 
theoretical, mainly focusing on political economy (Chester, 1986; Young, Lee, 1993) and was not 
orientated towards understanding managerial practical issues. During the Inter-War period, although 
                                                 
7 Oxford University Chancellor (1907-1925) 
8 Oxford University Gazette, 1913: 189 
9 William Archibald Spooner (1844-1930), Warden of New College (1903-1924) 
10 This idea relied on two easily made assumptions, “first, that Britain would retain its leading industrial and financial 
position, and secondly that, when an undergraduate chose his career, he might well put the likely material reward above 
all other considerations: his chief temptations would be towards materialism and avarice”. (Brock, Curthoys, 2000: 855) 
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a few fellows were in favour of business education, no more was heard about the idea of setting up 
a business education programme at Oxford11.  
 
It was as late as 1949 that the need for business education were mentioned more seriously. This 
confirms the idea of an existing correlation between Oxford’s lack of interest in business education 
and the very nature of British capitalism. In fact, the increased interest of Oxford fellows in 
management education corresponded to the success of the “managerial revolution” in the United 
States (Berle, Means, 1968). Family capitalism was giving way to the economy of the modern 
business enterprise. An increasing number of businessmen started questioning why business should 
remain a profession which needed no academic training and was considered on a lower level than 
medicine or engineering12. It is in this context that Oxford welcomed the annual Conference of the 
Federation of British Industry, which gathered fifty-five representatives of industry and sixty 
university members in 1949 (Weston, 1994: 129). The Committee’s Annual Report for that year 
revealed that “MS for undergraduates were deprecated. (…) More Arts men should be recruited into 
industry, but medium- and small-sized firms who have not previously recruited inexperienced 
graduates find practical difficulty in working them in during their first year or two… To this 
problem is related the Conference’s preoccupation with the need for vacation courses for Arts men 
in industrial companies” (Ibid). The needs of business education were now formulated explicitly for 
the first time and stated the requirement for the creation of educational training programmes in 
business, within University.   
 
- The unsuccessful attempts to get business training programmes in Cambridge University 
At Cambridge, the 1900s coincided with Alfred Marshall’s developments of industrial and business 
organisation. He is the one who specifically argued the need for management education at the 
University level13. His first attempt to introduce MS can be traced back to the late 1850s. The social 
sciences at large only appeared in the list of subjects for examination in Cambridge in 196914, but 
the idea of studying the human was sowed at Cambridge University with the introduction of the 
“Moral Science Tripos” by William Whewell in 1848. However, the Moral Science Tripos included 
all the kinds of human enquiry and worldly concern. Soon, each started to assert itself by claiming a 
separate tripos. It is in this context that Alfred Marshall, Professor of Political Economy (1885-
1908), pleaded for a separate economic tripos growing out of the Moral Sciences tripos. Just back 
from the United-States in 1885, he lectured on American industry and began to write the Economics 
of Industry (Marshall, 1879) for the university extension classes. By the 1890s, Marshall had 
already moved economics much nearer to industrial life and practical affairs. In a “Plea for the 
Creation of a Curriculum in Economics” (Marshall, 1902), he claimed the need to make economics 
a separate subject on the grounds that business needed managers specifically trained as such 
(Sanderson, 1989: 198-202)” (Fauri, 1998: 36).  
 
As states the “Report of the Economics and Political Science Syndicate (dated 4 March 1903), 
which was the founding stone of the Economics Tripos at Cambridge, Marshall started his battle of 
professional independence of economics by pointing out: “England, which long held the undisputed 
leadership in Economics, has suffered in recent years from the lack of adequate provision for the 
study of that subject at the Universities” (Nishizawa, 2002:7). He compares the recognition of 
                                                 
11 For instance, Lionel Hichens (New College), wanted a recognition that “industry was primarily a national service”, 
the object of those engaged in it being “first and foremost the good of the community as a whole” (Hichens, 1918: 22).  
12 At the end of the 19th Century, Oxford University began to recognise Engineering as a discipline. After some 
struggle, the Department of Engineering Science was originally established and first recognised by Oxford University in 
1908. Engineering appeared as the interstice of applied maths and mechanics (Borthwick, 2008; Howatson, 2008).   
13 Cf. on that matter Nishizawa, T., (2002), “Marshall, Ashley on Education of Businessman and ‘Science of Business’? 
Marshall School of Economics in the Making”, Study Series n°48, Centre for Historical Social Science Litterature, 
Hitosubashi University.  
14 Geoffrey Hawthorn’s account in “Studying the Human World”. Geoffrey Hawthorn is a Fellow of Clare Hall College 
and was Professor of International Politics until 2007. 
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Economics in the United States to Britain - and particularly Cambridge - where only forty or fifty 
undergraduates have done some work related to economics during their studies. Thus, he stresses: 
“There was no scope for a young man to earn a livelihood in Cambridge by preparing himself to 
deal with the economic problems of coming generation. This is our most urgent need” arguing that 
in the objective to deal with the subject adequately, Cambridge needed at least one additional 
Professorship or Readership in Economics. “But, even so, Cambridge would be much less equipped 
not only than Harvard and Yale, but also than younger university like Columbia”. (Nishizawa, 
2002: 8). In order to have an effective Cambridge “school” of economics, new tripos needed to be 
set up. But painfully, it was not until eighteen years later that Alfred Marshall could achieve his 
objective of gaining an independent status for Economics. By tracing back the origins of the 
Economic tripos, many reasons emerge that could explain the rejection of MS at Cambridge.   
 
When in 1885 Alfred Marshall came back to Cambridge, political economy courses were taught and 
examined within the Moral Sciences Tripos as a minor part of the Indian Civil Service course. The 
subject could therefore only be studied seriously as an optional special subject in Part II of the 
Moral Sciences Tripos, for which there were very few candidates. Marshall disliked this 
configuration and had the desire to liberate Economics from the Moral Science tripos so as to 
systematize the subject (The Cambridge University Reporter, 1885-86: 579). Major actors of 
Cambridge history of economics, such as Keynes and Cunningham were in favour of increasing 
Economics studies. However there were central disagreements. Keynes was opposed to Marshall’s 
idea that economics should be liberated from the philosophical pressure of Moral Sciences. Keynes 
also liked the idea that post-graduate study of economics should be more developed in Cambridge 
but did not think that any fundamental change in undergraduate curriculum was necessary. This 
disagreement nurtured a long dispute and constituted a serious hurdle to the establishment of the 
new training programme. 
 
Alfred Marshall’s struggle was primarily conducted with the idea that Economics should have 
practical use. This was the other main reason explaining why the process was so long. Marshall was 
a pioneer in attempting to relate economics to the real world of business and industry. At 
Cambridge this position was clearly denunciated in two main ways. For Keynes, Marshall’s 
statement that Economics is an inductive science was wrong. Still, Marshall thought it was essential 
for students that may become future managers to “acquire an extensive knowledge of facts i.e. big 
facts, in order that they may understand how a sense of proportion is, after sound reasoning, the 
most important equipment of an economist. (…) The influence of clear reasoners without sense of 
proportion, or knowledge of reality, is not an unmixed good”.15  
 
Another main opposition is to be noted, coming from the influential Cunningham16. He was a 
fervent opponent to the proposed New Tripos claiming that there was no need to introduce MS in 
the form of a full three years course. On the contrary, he thought it desirable to only develop a more 
specific business course. According to Cunningham, it was not wise to try to promote economic 
study and at the same time, develop training for businessmen at University level.  He would rather 
tackle the two issues one at a time, and make business education more specific. In other words, he 
viewed the introduction of a Management tripos as a tendency of the institution towards “over 
specialisation” and so preferred specialisation of some courses only. He also totally disagreed with 
Marshall’s struggle for a new tripos in so far as the idea was to develop non-specialised training for 
businessmen. Indeed, Marshall believed that general management education including subjects that 
do not have any direct connection with what the manager will do, would produce better managers 
                                                 
15 Marshall’s letter to Keynes on 6 February 1902, quoted by Nishisawa, 2002, p. 16 
16 Ven. William Cunningham ;  1874 : Lecturer at the University of Cambridge, 1884 : Professsor of Economics, King’s 
College London, 1891 : Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. He was also a candidate to Professorship of Political 
Economy in 1884, the same year as Marshall, which can explain part of the conflict and his harsh criticism against 
Marshall. 
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than only technical instruction. In this perspective he argued iteratively: “To a colliery manager, 
who has made a thorough study of geology, the shafts and galleries of a mine are a scientific 
museum and laboratory: his mind grows with his work, and he may increase the world's wealth of 
knowledge. As geology is related to mining, so is economics to general business” (Marshall, 1919: 
821-22)17.  
 
Although Marshall tried to tone down his position at the Senate in 1903, saying that of course 
providing a good education for business men was “not the main object” but “a secondary objective”, 
he emphasised the importance of this secondary objective for the university’s durability: “For, if 
this University should refuse to do what business men required: if in return they should, as it was 
said they were already doing, tend more and more to send their sons to new Universities (even 
though thereby the glorious training of Oxford or Cambridge corporate life were lost); and if, in 
consequence, the rising generation of wealthy business men became the loyal sons of the newer and 
not the older Universities, then...this University might regret too late that it had seemed somewhat 
different to the opinion of business men.”18 In reality, Marshall was absolutely convinced that 
businessmen were hostile to Economics because they have a false view of Economics. Therefore it 
was necessary to open this discipline further to get businessmen and public recognition. Marshall 
finally managed to create the Economics Tripos in 190319, with the idea that it would particularly 
address future businessmen  
 
Incidentally, it is interesting to note the way MS evolved in Cambridge was very particular. It was 
completely linked to the Engineering Department. This may perhaps have stifled the growth of MS 
at Cambridge from thereon. It certainly oriented the specialisation of the discipline at Cambridge. 
Thus, the first evidence of the existence of MS in Cambridge can be found in 1954, as part of the 
department of Engineering. There was no department for Management in its own right20. The 
lectures, mostly “industrial management” were given as part of the Engineering Department, and 
most engineers thought the subject was a complete waste of time21. In the early 1960s, there was a 1 
year post-graduate Diploma in Industrial Management within the Engineering Department, with a 
dedicated group of lecturers from within the Department. The Diploma started life in 1959 and had 
a strong managerial theme to it, taught mainly in the department.  
 
II.2. The gradual acceptance of Management Education at Oxbridge (1950s – 1980s) 
The failure of early initiatives to establish business education at Oxford and Cambridge was 
followed by a period of gradual acceptance by some of the departments and fellows in both 
Universities. This gradual process took various forms and differed in both institutions; yet being 
strongly influenced by an increasing relationship with industry. The publication of the Robbins’ 
report in the early 1960s emphasised the need for two major post-graduate schools and was soon 
used by Lord Franks who wrote a complementary report which sought to provide detailed 
recommendations about the implementation of these new schools of business in England. Lord 
Franks, who had just become Provost of Worcester College in Oxford in 1962, first thought about 
the possibility of establishing a business school in Oxford and Cambridge. However, as Graves 
remarked, “(…) nobody in Oxford was thinking in those terms’, suggesting that this might provide 
                                                 
17 Marshall, 1919: 821-22) Industry and trade; Appendice K “On Education, with special reference to career) A Study of 
industrial Technique and Business Organisation; and of Their influences on the Conditions of various classes and 
nations. Fourth edition, 1923. London: Macmillan.  
18 The Cambridge University Reporter, 14th May 1903, p.774. 
19 The Economics and Political Science Syndicate finally reported on 4 March 1903, recommending the establishment 
of a new Tripos. This Report was debated by Senate on 7 May and a full account appeared in the Reporter, 14 May 
1903. pp. 763-74. 
20 Judge Business School’s Website (« A Brief History », « Facts and figures ») 
21 Pagnamenta P. (2009) The University of Cambridge: An 800th Anniversary Portrait, Third Millennium Publishing, 
(pp 163-174) 304 pp. 
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the University with “low grade study”” (Graves, 2001: 16). As a result, the Vice-Chancellor made 
clear to Franks that the University would not approve such a School. Therefore, on the basis of 
Robbins’ conclusions, Lord Franks’ committee recommended the establishment of “two high 
quality post-graduate schools, in association with London and Manchester Universities (…)”22. The 
following accounts the years which followed Lord Franks’ recommendation, leaving Oxford and 
Cambridge without a school of business.  
 
- The foundation of the Oxford Centre for MS (1965) and of Templeton College (1983): A long 
process of emergence 
Before the beginning of the 1980s, management could be studied in Oxford under the hospice of an 
Oxford Centre for Management Studies (OCMS). The creation of this Centre was the result of a 
slow but increasing cooperation between the University and industry. As seen in the previous 
section, the 1949 Federation of British Industry Conference expressed the first needs of business 
education and gave Ewart Escritt, the Oxford University Appointments Committee’s secretary 
(1947-1970) of the time, the idea to set up a course and “to bring together groups of young men in 
the age bracket 27 to 33, who have varied specialist experience, but are not yet in high 
administrative or technical posts”23. As a result, the first Oxford University Business Summer 
School (OUBSS) took place in the summer 1953 at Worcester College. The lectures given in this 
Summer School were taught by economists and involved mainstream economic theory, namely 
microeconomics (theory of the firm and of industries) and macroeconomics (labour economics and 
government issues). The School was not officially recognised as part of Oxford University, but was 
considered as an “associated institution”24. Although it would be misleading to argue that the 
OUBSS was a conscious attempt to establish a management education programme in Oxford, it still 
seems reasonable to argue that the organisation of the School strengthened bonds between the 
University and the business world. In the mid-1960s, after the various attempts made to diffuse 
business education in the University, a group of Oxford dons, including Norman Leyland and Sir 
Norman Chester gathered a small group of businessmen to indulge in a “notable piece of private 
enterprise and set up a management centre, if not within the University, at least in Oxford” (Snow, 
1995: 5). In 1965, the administration of the OUBSS was passed from the Appointments Committee 
to the newly formed Oxford Centre for MS. Until then, the Summer School was run under the 
auspices of the University, but was not a University course in the usual sense.  
 
At this time, Oxford was still hostile to the introduction of business education. The Advisory 
Council on Education for Management in England, represented by Mr. Platt, initiated discussions 
with some Oxford fellows. Hence, in January 1961, Mr. Platt, on behalf of an American educational 
Trust founded by the management consultancy firm McKinsey & Company Inc., offered financial 
help to fund a report on the possibilities of developing management education in Oxford (Cf. 
Appendix 3). Following this generous offer, the Board of the Faculty of Social Studies in Oxford 
agreed to form a special Committee on management education25 which soon agreed on two main 
points. The first was that the enquiry suggested by Platt was needed and “very desirable”26, the 
second the idea that a College Fellow was to be relieved from his college duties for one term to visit 
                                                 
22 London Business School Administrative Records, Collection Outline.  
23 University of Oxford Appointments Committee for men and women. Reports for 1952: 7. 
24 In Oxford, an ‘associated institution’ was associated, but financially independent from the University and cannot 
deliver any Oxford University degrees. At the time, the Oxford Centre for Hebrew Studies (initially financed by 
Barclay, who also financed the Oxford Centre for MS, in 1965) along with the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies were 
also both considered as “associated institutions” (Personal conversation with Clark Brundin, 22nd September 2008).  
25 For this purpose, the following members of Oxford University were appointed:  Professor Hicks (Chairman), Warden 
of Nuffield (Professor Chester), Professor Ayer, Mr. Henderson, Mr. Jackson, Mr. Leyland, Mr. Nicholas, and Mr. J.F. 
Wright. Minutes of the Board of the Faculty of Social Studies, 2nd February 1961, Oxford MS Archives hold at the 
Bodleian Library (for now on referred as OMSA). 
26 Report of the Committee on MS, Board of the Faculty of Social Studies, 13th March 1961, OMSA.  
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the United States and to write a report on Business education in Oxford27. However, the committee 
did not agree on the source of the funding, as some members thought that it could be embarrassing 
to apply for a grant to an American Foundation “closely associated with a Firm of Management 
Consultants”28. As an alternative, Norman Chester approached Nuffield College and successfully 
collected the required sum for the purpose of this investigation into the possibility of developing 
management education in Oxford29. In May 1961, John Wright was chosen as the person to be sent 
to the US for three months, in the following autumn. For this occasion, he suggested to the 
Chairman of the Committee, Professor Hicks, a preliminary outline of the way in which he would 
plan his enquiry. This letter - reproduced in Appendix 4 – raised two main questions the inquiry 
should be able to answer. The first aimed at testing the extent to which management education was 
considered “academically respectable” by Oxford standards. The second took the issue one step 
further, assuming that Oxford would in fact require business education, and posing the question of 
which type of organisation would then be adequate for introducing management education.  
 
When John Wright returned from his visit to America, the conclusions of his report were not in 
favour of the establishment of a business school in Oxford, and delayed any potential move in this 
direction the University might have contemplated. Part IV of the report, entitled ‘Some Conclusions 
and Inconclusions’, acknowledged the significant effort made by the American system into the 
development of management education and its consequences for the “useful research” done in the 
leading US business schools. However, John Wright argued that this successful research was not in 
any way integrated with the teaching programme of the schools. Therefore, according to him, 
“given that business education is to take place immediately after graduation, I could find little fault 
with the United States schools I visited. But I can work up little enthusiasm for the establishment of 
similar programmes in Oxford” (Wright, 1962: 41). Wright concluded his report, claiming that “if 
MS are going to be introduced here [in Oxford], it must be on the grounds that they bear some 
useful relation to our existing studies. But that will not bear that relation unless more interest can be 
fostered here within the existing social studies faculty about topics in the field of managerial 
studies” (Ibid: 42). This statement outlined the irony of the matter as a whole: Business Studies 
could start being taught at the university level on condition that research in the discipline already 
existed. The only way of providing initial research in the field could, therefore, only be initiated by 
colleges, which were independent entities from the University, unlikely to be able to cope with the 
financial costs of hiring a fellow in management. John Hicks organised a meeting to discuss issues 
arising from Wright’s report. The conclusions were that “without additional staff, not much more 
could be done than broaden the University Business Summer School” (Graves, 2001: 15)30. As 
Graves stated, “MS was seen as useful but not really Oxford’s cup of tea, or glass of port” (Idem).  
 
Despite the various oppositions to the establishment of management education at Oxford, 
persistence and Leyland’s enthusiasm led him to create a privately funded centre in MS31. Clifford 
Barclay, a 50 years old London businessman, who had already made his fortune, offered his 
financial help to establish management education at Oxford. However, this financial help would 
                                                 
27 “He would be responsible for writing a report describing and analysing American and other experience and would be 
free to express his own views as to the way MS might develop in Britain” (Idem). 
28 Idem.  
29 Letter from D.N. Chester to the Vice-Chancellor, 10th March 1961, OMSA, File 1.    
30 The idea of establishing a Diploma in MS also arose, but the committee stated that ‘because the background of the 
students would be very miscellaneous; the studies in which such people could usually engage in common, at anything 
more than a very elementary level, are not easy to find… A general Diploma would, inevitably, be a low-grade 
Diploma; and we see no advantage in the provision of that sort of training in Oxford’ (Graves, 2001: 15). 
31 The justification of the Centre, being privately funded was expressed by Norman Leyland, as follows: “(…) we think 
that administratively the best way of achieving this is by establishing an institution completely independent of 
University control so as to be free to experiment, yet drawing upon the teaching resources available in Oxford and at the 
same time contributing a new element to these resources.” (in Graves, 2001: 18).  
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only consist of investing the initial capital, i.e. the fixed costs of the building site32. The OCMS was 
incorporated in 1965 as a company limited by guarantee but was not recognised as a University 
institution, but obtained the status of an “associated institution”. The Centre combined students with 
different statutes, namely “a six-month course for general managers and be-spoke courses for 
specific companies; although there were also some university students taking a B.Phil. in MS and 
some management orientated courses for undergraduates” (Tricker, 2006: 20). In the early years of 
the existence of the Centre, the main programme was a six months Senior Managers Development 
Programme. This programme was aimed at men who were “already senior managers” or who were 
“likely to become so” (Senior Managers Development Programme, 1970: 1). The contents of the 
courses – reproduced in Appendix 5 - give a good indication of the orientation of management 
education at Oxford: Wright’s recommendations from 1962 were applied. First, the teaching was 
aimed at executive managers and second, the lectures were built on existing ones in other social 
sciences in the university.  
 
When Kitzinger became the Director of the OCMS in 1980, he argued that “Oxford is a collegiate 
University. (…) The attempt to create a Faculty of Management, which is not dominated by the 
Faculty of Economics, will never work. We have to turn the Management Centre into a college” 
(Ibid: 21). At this point, the Centre encountered financial difficulties; “the revenue account was 
healthy, but capital was still badly needed to enlarge the Centre” and Kitzinger firing “an arrow into 
the blue” (Raeburn, 1995) persuaded the editor of the American Oxonian, the house magazine of 
North American Rhodes Scholars Alumni to publish an article entitled “College in Search of a 
Founder”. After some weeks, John Templeton, who had been a Rhodes Scholar at Balliol, contacted 
Uwe Kitzinger and negotiations led to a conditional offer of five million dollars. After John 
Templeton’s benefaction, three years later, Templeton College (TC) was born. Templeton was then 
seen as preserving the independence of the discipline from the University, as had been Leyland’s 
preferred option.     
 
- Towards a co-operation between the university and the business world: The Cambridge Science 
Park (1970-Present) 
MS began life at Cambridge in 1954 thanks to an endowment that enabled the first courses to be 
developed in the Engineering Department. Cambridge was in fact clearly oriented towards 
technology management and, to a large extent the emergence of MS at Cambridge was particularly 
unusual compared to Oxford. In the 1960s, the Wilson Government urged British universities to 
engage more with industry and to strengthen the links with public and private firms. Interestingly 
though, Cambridge’s response to this, was not to develop management education, but rather to set 
up a science park. These initial conditions influenced the way MS emerged and was shaped by the 
context of Cambridge University. 
 
In particular, a key turning point was in 1967, when Cambridge University set up a senate 
subcommittee in order to give recommendations on the planning aspects of the relationships 
between the University and science based industry. As a result, the Mott report named after its 
chairman Professor Sir Nevill Mott (Head of the Cavendish Laboratory) was published in 1969. The 
report argued that the Holdford report – previously published in 1950 – had caused a series of issues 
both for the University of Cambridge and industry. In fact, Sir Holdford had recommended 
constraining and discouraging the development of new industries in Cambridge, so as to preserve 
the University’s city character. This had led to many refusals towards companies that wanted to 
locate in Cambridge. For instance, IBM did not get permission to set up its European R&D 
Headquarter there (Segal Quince Wicksteed, 1985: 18)33. After various burning debates, the Mott 
report – which took over a year to compile – involved scientists who had ascertained the benefits to 
                                                 
32 Personal conversation with Desmond Graves, 23rd September 2008.  
33 Some suggest this is one of the reasons why the French Riviera seized the opportunity to welcome the company near 
by Sophia-Antipolis Science Park (at La Gaude). 
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MIT and Stanford University of close interaction between university and research based 
commercial activity. The report recommended the establishment of a Science Park. In 1972, it was 
Trinity College which officially established Cambridge Science Park. At the same time, the 
increasing effort of collaboration with industry was also illustrated by the creation of the Wolfson 
Cambridge Industrial Liaison Unit which aimed to support technology transfer and was originally 
part of the Engineering Department.  
 
From 1972, MS at Cambridge slowly and gradually emerged around the Cambridge Science Park’s 
activities. Hence, unsurprisingly, the type of management research developing at Cambridge was 
significantly different from the one evolving in Oxford at the same period. The impact of the 
science park’s activities on the future theoretical and empirical shape of MS is therefore essential to 
understanding the current orientation followed by management education in Cambridge.   
 
As Garnsey and Lawton Smith (1998) pointed out, Cambridge was known to have a stronger 
science and technology base than Oxford and probably contained the largest concentration of 
physical, technological, biological, medical and agricultural research laboratories in any university 
in the country. In particular, Cambridge is often referred to as a leader in computer development 
and applied sciences. As a matter of fact, the Mott Report estimated that up to 25% of the research 
and technical staff at the University were involved in applied industrial research. In contrast, no 
equivalent estimates were made for Oxford. Essentially, the applied sciences were stronger in 
Cambridge, especially in engineering and in computing (Garnsey and Lawton Smith, 1998). The 
emphasis put on engineering activities had two main consequences: first, the type of activity 
fostered (computing, hardware software) was better adapted to the creation of small firms, which 
led to the construction of a whole network of university spin outs34. Second, the existence and 
development of this network enhanced the need for management training of new high-tech firms.  
 
In 1985, a report entitled The Cambridge Phenomenon: The Growth of High technology Industry in 
a University Town was published by a Cambridge Consulting firm Segal Quince Wicksteed (SQW) 
and sought to analyse the growing links between the Cambridge industrial cluster and the 
University. In particular, the report highlighted growth of high-technology business activities in 
Cambridge and found that the academic spin-offs tended to grow faster, “not be owner managed, 
and to be more likely to receive venture capital” (Kenney, 2003: 179). The links between the 
University and the industry were therefore a success through the networks of high-tech companies 
from the University it was fostering. The next priority was therefore for the University side to 
provide business support aimed at the participating firms of the cluster. In collaboration with the 
University and in a similar way the OUBSS emerged in Oxford, the creation of various independent 
institutions seeking to develop business support for innovative firms followed.  
 
Dr. Chris Johnson, Senior bursar of St John’s College, following a visit to the USA in 1984 
proposed the idea to open a Centre for Innovation, as existed in Salt Lake City (Utah) at the time. 
The Cambridge Phenomenon report convinced St John’s College that investment in the innovation 
sector was likely to be successful and the St. John’s Innovation Centre eventually opened in 1987. 
This independent institution proposed to give support to young start-ups and usually University 
spin-outs. The University gradually realised that business training was increasingly needed to 
acquire the appropriate skills to run an engineering firm and started to think more seriously about 
the development of management education in response to the innovative environment of the 
Cambridge Science Park. On the same basis, Dr. David Keeble – Fellow in Geography – founded in 
1989 with three Cambridge colleagues, the University’s Small Business Research Centre. Keeble 
was one of the first geographers “to recognize the growing importance of entrepreneurship and 
innovation in a world increasingly being driven by these key forces” (Kitson, Martin, Tyler, 2004: 
                                                 
34 Cf. Appendix 8: The Hi-Tech Start-ups associated with the Cambridge University (Copyright: Y.M.Myint and Dr. 
Shailendra Vyakarnam, CfEL, Judge Business School) 
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867). The context of the Cambridge Science Park was particularly influential on the research of the 
newly constituted centre oriented towards the way entrepreneurship, innovation and enterprise 
shaped regional economic development. The Cambridge University Small Business Research 
Centre brought together a group of academics drawn from two different departments: Applied 
Economics and Geography and was hosted by the Department of Applied Economics. The Centre’s 
primary function was, yet, closely concerned with MS issues as it aimed to integrate data on 
industrial organisation, firm behaviour and organisational change and to apply it to the study of 
small companies. Substantial funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) 
secured the future of the Cambridge University Small Business Research Centre which became in 
1994 the Centre for Business Research (CBR). Since then, the centre has made a major contribution 
to national and international understanding of small firm development and to UK and European 
Union policy on small businesses. The modern CBR is still independent of any academic unit and is 
directed by Professor Alan Hughes.  
 
Thus, research on business organisation, innovation and organisational change existed in 
Cambridge but was studied under the hospice of independent institutions such as St John’s 
Innovation Centre and the Small Business Research Centre, which later became the centre for 
Business Research. Interestingly, the only academic community who was interested by management 
related issues was the economic geographers and to a lesser extent, applied economists. The only 
courses recognised by the University in MS at Cambridge were located in the Engineering 
Department. The institutionalisation of the Cambridge Business School from this small group of 
researchers in the Engineering Department is accounted in Section II.3.    
 
II.3. The Oxbridge process of business schools’ institutionalisation (1980s – Present) 
This paper argues that the emergence of the SBS in Oxford and of the JBS in Cambridge cannot be 
understood outside their contexts of emergence and processes of institutionalisation. Rather, within 
the perspective of a processual analysis, the creation of both schools is the result of the existence of 
previous institutions which paved the way for the current specificities adopted by the schools. The 
processes of emergence of previous institutions concerned with management education have been 
described in the previous sub-section, and we now aim to show how both current business schools 
have emerged from these existing institutions.  
 
- From Templeton College (1983) to the emergence of the Saïd Business School (2001) 
The understanding of the current status, orientation, functioning and climate of the Saïd Business 
School has to be built around the analysis of a sequence of unintended consequences inherited from 
the past historical context of management education at Oxford University. This account constitutes 
a very recent history and while the interviews we conducted provided us with a large amount of 
detail regarding the period pre- SBS, most people were very much less inclined to share information 
for publication about a more recent period (1990-2010). Various controversial debates as well as 
internal conflicts characterising this period involved fellows and university players who are still 
around and are not willing to comment in detail on this evolution. It is therefore fair to say that this 
account does present some bias, since parts of the interviews cannot be published. Yet, 
documentary sources (primary source - diary notes and unpublished manuscripts - as well as 
secondary sources - media covers and secondary literature) are used to reinforce stories derived 
from interviews (Pettigrew, 1979).  
 
In the early 1980s, John Templeton’s benefaction to the OCMS required four conditions listed by 
Ashley Raeburn35 in his unpublished memoirs, including requirements for matriculation rights and 
                                                 
35 Businessman and former Chairman of the Council of OCMS and of TC 1979-1985 
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seeking for a Royal Charter36 (Raeburn, 1995: 4). In 1984, the University did its bid and agreed on 
the matriculation right but did no more at this stage than “to note the Royal Charter ambition” 
(Ibid.)37. The early years of development of TC were coupled with an unfavourable economic 
climate which indirectly strengthened management education at Oxford. As rightly stressed by 
Robert Tricker38, the fund raising campaign organised by Oxford was a response to “very severe 
financial problems”, mainly resulting from “Mrs. Thatcher and her ministers”, who were, therefore 
to a large extent, “unwittingly the cause of the next flurry of interest in management study in 
Oxford” (Tricker, not dated, OX91A: 1). At this stage, Oxford University was, to a large extent, 
forced to participate in the development of MS in response to this economic climate, but also to 
remain competitive on the academic international scene and possibly to generate some financial 
support from executive education, such as an MBA programme39. Hence, the University set up a 
small working party under Sir Claus Moser (Warden of Wadham College) which was equally 
composed of economics dons and of Templeton fellows (Raeburn, 1995: 5) and became known as 
the Moser Committee40. A report, entitled “Report on the future of MS” was completed in March 
1988 and circulated, on confidential basis, on 11 April to all members of Council and the Board of 
Faculties. Its circulation among TC was subject to discussion with Mr. David Rowland, Chairman 
of the Council of Templeton, indicating as stressed by the Vice-Chairman of the Board of Faculties 
“signs of unease about the report in some quarters connected with Templeton” (Ibid.: xxx). Yet, 
after further discussion, the Council finally authorised the Vice-Chancellor to approve the final 
version of the report and to publish it in the Oxford University Gazette on 5 May 1988 (Gazette, 
1988: 766)41. The major recommendations of the report published in the Hebdomadal Council of 
the GBF (20 April 1988) are reproduced in Appendix 6.  
 
The Moser Committee also began to enquire about the delicate problem regarding the relationship 
between a new school of business and the existing TC. Raeburn refers to Moser’s recommendation 
as “a takeover of Templeton College by a new University School for MS”, mentioning that it was 
“to take over the assets of Templeton, appoint its fellows as university lecturers and adopt the 
Templeton name as the “Templeton School of MS”” (Raeburn, 1995: 6). According to former 
members of TC we interviewed and as the Moser report seems to indicate at first42, this new school 
was meant to be built on the ground of Kennington – the then land of TC – and the existing college 
would be used as a hall of residence. The Moser Committee expresses what Raeburn referred to as a 
“takeover” more such as a natural process of evolution within the University; that is, the assets of 
Templeton were being used to enrich the new School of MS. The report mentions: 
                                                 
36 A royal charter made an institution into an independent college of the University of Oxford. The only two universities 
in the country that had that were Oxford and Cambridge 
37 A detailed factual history of TC would be far too long to be developed here – to a large extent also irrelevant – and 
has been previously reported by Desmond Graves, former fellow of Templeton in his book “Templeton College – The 
First Thirty Years, A Family Affair” privately published in 2001. Interestingly though, the title of the book is in itself 
significant. Beyond its development towards the world of business and its rapprochement with the University, TC staff 
was very much willing to develop a family oriented atmosphere, through for instance its programme for gastronomy 
entitled “Gourmet’s Oxford” during the long vacation, its reputation for conference venue providing excellent 
administrative and domestic support staff and its commissioned programmes which were typically lasting two to four 
weeks and exclusively run for corporate members.  
38 Former President of the OCMS during the years 1971-1978. 
39 In 1988, it was argued in a discussion by the Planning and Development Committee of the University that “a major 
expansion of MS will unlock funds for other purposes” (GBF, 1988: 767).  
40 Michael Earl was the only Templeton man appointed to the Committee.  
41 This journal constitutes the official and authorised journal of record of the University of Oxford. Its weekly issues, 
from September to July, throughout the academic year have been published since 1870 and only put online since 1990. 
The Gazette provides its reader information regarding Oxford University, such as lists of events and lectures, the 
official announcements, the newly appointed professors, or the available vacancies. 
42 “So our eyes turned naturally to TC and the Kennington site. Not only has TC been the main home of MS, but it has 
many other attractions, not least its attracting facilities and staff. Moreover, its site is a fine one with much opportunity 
for development” (Moser report, in Tricker, not dated, OX91A: 6) 
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“Templeton College would not be the School of MS, but would be incorporated as a central 
part of it…In this connection we would wish to recognise the current tenure position of the 
academic staff, and, indeed, the employment rights of all those working at Templeton 
College: they should become University employees at appropriate grading” (Ibid.: 7) 
 
Whatever the tacit strategy of the University was, the Moser Committee anticipated the existence of 
some “problems”, stressing that this “integration (…) would mean that the facilities on the site 
would become those of the School of Management of the University”, that “raising money from 
various sources would become part of University fund raising” and last but not least, that “total 
independence would inevitably be lost, since the School, of which Templeton College would be part 
would ultimately be responsible to the University” (Ibid.). However, somehow expecting the 
Templeton council members’ reactions, the report admitted that this integration would face real 
problems but that “the gains for Templeton College far outweigh the losses”; since the central role 
offered to TC in the new School would be preferred to the “creation of a new institution which 
would compete with it” (Ibid.). Hence, it is often argued that it is from the relationship between the 
University and TC that lies “the key to understanding the future path plotted for MS at Oxford” 
(Snow, 1995: 7).  
 
Three other relevant issues were also raised by the publication of the Moser report in the Gazette. 
Firstly, the Council of TC strongly questioned the “control of MS by the Social Studies Board”43. 
The University’s response to this concern was supported by the fact that “post holders in 
Management would, for a long time because of shortage of resources, need to teach in related 
disciplines, and the Faculty Board would have to be responsible for the organisation and 
distribution of the teaching resources in these circumstances” (GBF, 1988-1989: cxviii). 
Interestingly, this paradox echoes to a large extent, the unresolved conclusions already made by 
John Wright more than twenty years earlier.  
Concern about the salaries of the potential new members of the School was also brought up by the 
report. The University remained rather clear on this matter, arguing that “it was recognised that de 
facto the new salary proposals would not enable the University to pay significantly higher salaries 
to particular individuals” (GBF, 1988-1989: xi). However, the Board adds that “considerable 
flexibility would be necessary in certain areas (in order to attract the best staff to those subjects 
were high quality individuals were scarce) but that a way to achieve this was not for the university 
to pay higher salaries but for individuals to be allowed considerable latitude in consultancy 
arrangements or arrangements for holding part-time appointments in the University together with 
part-time appointments elsewhere (Ibid.: xi-xii)”44.  
Last but not least, the proposal of a two-year MBA did not gather enough evidence to convince the 
University for such a course as against a one-year one. According to the Planning and Development 
Committee, it seemed difficult to believe that “many employers would be willing to let their staff go 
for as long as the 21 months of the proposed course” (GBF, 1990: 768). As a result, the final 
version of the Moser report rejected the two-year MBA “above all (because) it would be hard to get 
financial support for it…” and suggested, instead, a “specialist” one-year MBA.    
One year after its publication, in November 198945, the Moser Report was soon followed by a 
second University report on the subject chaired by Donald Hay, prominent industrial economist at 
the time. Although the Hay Working Party Report takes Moser as the starting point, it differs from 
the Moser recommendations, especially regarding the MBA programme. Hay rejects the 
                                                 
43 Independence issues related to the content of the discipline per se have been documented in a previous paper. For 
further details on the subject, see Arena (2009).  
44 Later on that year, the Planning and Development Committee admitted to be reluctant “to see a different salary 
structure in Oxford for teachers of Management, when many other subjects are having difficulty in recruiting, and it 
hopes that outside earnings could be a way round the problem” (GBF, 1990: 769).   
45 As its predecessor, the Hay report was published in the Oxford University General Board of the Faculties (Hilary 
Term 1990, Vol. CLXXXIV).  
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“specialist” one-year MBA and suggests a two-year MBA, instead46. As a result, the buildings 
estimated by the Hay report need to be much larger to handle 300 MBAs. Despite their points of 
divergence on financial estimations of the School, the overall aim of both reports was to submit 
legislation to Congregation early in Hilary Term 1990 establishing the new School of Management; 
yet first needed to be secured of “a few key benefactions before any package was made public” 
(GBF, 1990: 764). The target under the funding Campaign for Oxford was set at £40million 
(Oxford University Gazette, 1997).  
 
In the establishment of the new School, the integration of TC in the new Business School was not 
an easy task, since the various governing bodies of the University had strong doubts about the 
academic rigor and excellence of MS at TC. In 1989, in the research selectivity exercise, Oxford 
was given “a score of 2 for Business and MS, this being the median figure, but rather below the 
mean of 2.4.”. Consequently, the Planning and Development Committee expressed the need for the 
University to see “an improvement in both the graduate teaching offered in its name at TC and in 
the research done there which is attributed to the University” (GBF, 1990: 767). At last, in 1990, 
Congregation agreed that the University should establish a business school. The integration of TC 
in the new School of Management was thought to be facilitated by the appointment of a single 
Director simultaneously acting for TC and for the New School. In 1992, Dr. Clark Brundin, an 
engineering scholar was brought up from Warwick University, where he had been the Vice-
Chancellor since 1985, to become the President of TC and the first Director of the Management 
Department at the University (since the School was not officially created at this point). At that stage, 
the whole operation was led by this one figure who soon and unsurprisingly became a target for 
general criticisms from both sides. Although the decision of building the new School on the 
premises owned by TC in Kennington had been taken and approved by Congregation, Clark 
Brundin expressed his view that the School should, instead, be located at the heart of Oxford. This 
view resulted from a more general feeling that the difficulty to get fundraising was probably due to 
the fact that no benefactors would be willing to invest in a fringe site not emblematic of Oxford, 
both in terms of location and architecture 47 . After all, the whole idea of Oxford is to have 
departments and colleges collaborating between each other beyond disciplinary divisions, and 
having the business school in town was facilitating these interactions. As a result of this general 
view, an embryonic Oxford School of MS emerged in the Old Radcliffe Infirmary and began to host 
some courses in Management. Some space of the working hospital was converted into a lecture 
theatre, a library and some offices to welcome the first intakes of students in Management in 199348. 
The conversion of this space was funded by the University, while the Oxford’s School in MS was 
still waiting for a benefactor.  
 
It was as late as 1996 that – coinciding with Clark Brundin’s retirement from full-time employment 
– that the University announced, after three years of discussions, the Syrian-born businessman 
Wafic Said put up the first £20 millions. The donation led the whole subject to become a matter for 
public debate and newspapers were all of a sudden announcing that “the relatively modest Oxford 
School of MS, created in 1990, was turned into the expensive and ambitious Said Business School” 
(Beckett, The Independent, 1999). One condition introduced by Mr. Saïd was that the University 
would obtain a matching £20 millions from other benefactors. At that stage, the biggest donation 
was from Lord Sainsbury who gave his name to the Saïd Business School library. John Kay was 
then invited to become the first Director of the Saïd Business School. The next step was to find a 
                                                 
46 This rejection is the result of “the comments of a group of personnel directors from major companies, the major 
recruiters of MBAs” which “show that they would not know what to do with specialist MBAs since they would not fit 
normal management and career development schemes. Like Moser the working party also rejects the one-year 
generalist MBA…” (GBF, 1990, Annexe E, MS: Note by the Chairman of the General Board: 778)   
47 TC’s architecture was designed by Norman Leyland at the end of the 1960s and looked very modern. For further 
details about the building, see Design (1969).   
48 At this time, Anthony Hopwood, who will then become the Dean of the SBS was appointed as the first director of the 
School’s MBA programme. 
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new site for this new “expensive and ambitious” Saïd Business School. Originally, the Planning and 
Development committee proposed to build on a green playing field site near Merton College in the 
centre of Oxford. Soon after this suggestion, in November 1996, Congregation voted 259-214 
against the business school proposals “because of concerns over the site, Saïd’s business 
background49 and his level of control over the School” (Carrie, 1999). The University had given an 
undertaking that no building would ever take place on this ground (Beckett, The Independent, 1999). 
After the rejection of this new plan by Congregation, John Kay threatened to resign if the dons 
rejected the plans one more time. “A lot of kerfuffle and much behind-the-scenes negotiation” 
followed these series of drama50. In June 1997, a new site for the development emerged despite its 
low quality and became the eventual home of Business Studies in Oxford. The site was located 
opposite Oxford railway station and was occupied by a prefabricated listed building – the old 
wooden London Middland and Scottish station – which had to be packed flat and sent off to railway 
enthusiasts in Buckinghamshire. Planning permission including pulling down the listed building 
was required. By the end of June, Congregation voted 342-55 to accept the plans and in December 
1998, Oxford City Council eventually granted planning permission51.  
 
Yet, at this stage, the remaining problems with TC were unresolved. John Kay lost count of the 
numbers of times he was “asked to explain the relationship between the University's business 
school and TC, especially to potential corporate supporters”. He pursues saying:  
“I could not explain it, because I could not understand it myself. Nor could the College, as is 
evident from Templeton's extensive press advertising, and its website. I inherited an entire 
drawer of a filing cabinet, containing records of discussions going back to 1982 on the 
relationship between the University and TC: but the discussions had no conclusions.” (Kay, 
2000: 4) 
As soon as he was appointed in 1996, Kay became determined to establish a strategy for the 
school’s development. However, although he had been a tutor in Oxford in the past, he was 
considered as an “outsider”52 as he was running a high-profile consultancy firm in London and soon 
realised the complexity of Oxford’s governance structure. In particular, he outlines “at this point, 
the process ran into the ground” since, according to him, “the University had no mechanism for 
proceeding with such discussions”. He pursues: “I was advised that I had to turn the document into 
specific proposals which would then be considered individually by diverse relevant committees. Of 
course, this approach missed the point. A plan to establish a new institution rests on a serious of 
interlinked initiatives (…)” (Ibid.) To cut the story short, as a result of this series of inconclusions, 
John Kay resigned suddenly in 1999 after two years of a five-year contract and provoked the 
publication of a large amount of articles in the press, arguing that John Kay “disappeared on holiday 
for the whole of his notice period” (Beckett, 1999), pursuing the “on-off saga” (Davies, 1999) of 
“Wafic Said's dream of building a business school in Oxford [which] has been dogged by 
controversy since its inception” (Currie, Griffiths, 1999).   
 
Nevertheless, this sequence of dramas was followed by a much smoother and successful series of 
events after Anthony Hopwood became the new Director of the School in 1999. According to his 
Obituary recently published in the Guardian, “he was fond of saying that “business is so interesting, 
and most business schools are so boring”. His vision was for an “intelligent” business school” 
(Miller, 2010: 35). On 5 November 2001, the SBS building finally opened – designed by Jeremy 
Dixon and Ed Jones, architects of the Royal Opera House conversion and the subtle extension of the 
                                                 
49 Wafic Saïd has been accused to be a Syrian arm-dealer and to use this money to fund the SBS. For further details 
about this controversy, see. Alderson, 2001 
50 Various people were surprised Wafic Saïd did not pull out; Kay who was one of them argued: “I do not think if it had 
been me I would have stuck with the project for so long” (Carrie, 1999).   
51 One last unintended drama was the protesting eco-warriors who were not too pleased about the removal of some trees 
by the School (Currie, Griffiths, 1999).    
52 This “outsider” element of his profile was considered as a strength by the appointment committee.  
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National Portrait Gallery. During the last ten years, the media coverage of the School has been far 
less frequent, and much more positive regarding its reputation, its performance and its intellectual 
vitality. Through the creation of additional teaching programmes and new research centers53, the 
School became highly competitive and managed to catch up with some older implemented schools 
of business such as the London Business School. As early as 2002, the School was awarded a grade 
5 by the Research Assessment Exercise and still pursues its search for academic excellence in the 
Business schools’ top international rankings. In 2002, Professor Michael Earl took over as Dean of 
Templeton, which retained responsibility for executive education. In 2005, this responsibility was 
also transferred to the Saïd Business School, “as a result of a successful round of complex 
negotiations between Michael Earl and Dean Anthony Hopwwod, thus creating a comprehensive 
academic business school, but with the facilities of the Kennington site (Egrove) retained for the 
teaching of a range of executive education courses” (Snow, 2010). The difficult relationship with 
Templeton College was ended in 2008, when Templeton left the Kennington site merging with 
Green College to form a new graduate Oxford college, Green-Templeton.     
 
- The emergence of the Judge Business School (1990-2005) 
While in Oxford, it is often argued that the main emphasis had been put on pure science, developing 
a significant comparative advantage in chemistry research, Cambridge built its reputation on 
applied research and engineering soon became the largest department in the University. In 1984, 
when Jacques Heyman became Head of the Engineering Department, the first year courses were 
reformed to put more emphasis on information engineering and electronics. For instance, Acorn 
Computers, a British computer company established in Cambridge, donated 60 microcomputers, 
allowing computer based teaching packages to be implemented. At the time, the first Management 
courses were taught by a small group of academics in MS who were still lobbying since the 1960s 
for the creation of a business school. Lecturers in MS were still located in the Engineering 
Department, but there was no Professor in Management. The key understanding for the current 
status of management education in Cambridge lies in the links built between the Engineering 
department and MS; and also in the role of the early advisors and benefactors in allowing the set up 
and the institutionalisation of the JBS.  
 
In the context of the Cambridge Phenomenon report published in 1985 and mentioned in the 
previous section, the University was increasingly concerned with management education but, yet, 
rather focused on technology management’s specific needs. The Department of Engineering in 
Cambridge rapidly became one of the leading centres of engineering in the world and constituted 
the most visible roots of management education in Cambridge. As Professor Arnoud De Meyer – 
current Director of the JBS – argues: “None of JBS growth or achievement over the last 20 years 
would have been possible without the aid of many supporters both inside and outside the University 
ranging from the Engineering Department, which gave this school much support in its early phases, 
to our benefactors.” Soon, the aim of the Department of Engineering was to “address the world's 
most pressing challenges with science and technology by working in collaboration with other 
disciplines, other institutions, companies, and the entrepreneurial community and also focus on 
applying research” 54 . The Department consists of six divisions, among which the division 
“Manufacturing Engineering” enhances the Group's international multidisciplinary research 
community to develop new understanding of manufacturing technology, operations, strategy and 
                                                 
53 The School counts nine research centers in 2010 : The BT Centre for Major Programme Management; The Oxford 
Centre for Entrepreneurship and Innovation; The Institute for Science, Innovation and Society; The Novak Druce 
Centre for Professional Service Firms; The Oxford Institute of Retail Management; The Oxford Private Equity Institute; 
The Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation; The Oxford University Centre for Corporate Reputation and The 
Skoll Centre for Social Entrepreneurship. 
54 Cambridge University Engineering Department And Engineers' Association: http://www-g.eng.cam.ac.uk/enginuity/. 
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policy, in close partnership with industry. Through its aim to understand and to provide policy tools 
oriented towards industrial competitiveness, the department is very closely linked with industry55. 
This orientation is not new and probably started when a MS group within the Engineering 
Department was set up in 1971. Members of this embryonic group played a significant role which is 
at the heart of the creation of MS at Cambridge. As recalled by Professor Geoff Walsham:  
“When I arrived in the Engineering Department in 1975 to start teaching Management 
Studies, there was a small group of lecturers. Very small. MS were not perceived as 
respectable in Cambridge. But then, I heard about the crusty old academic who used to say, 
apropos Engineering, that Cambridge had never been the same since it started awarding 
degrees in “plumbing”! (…) It showed my colleagues and I that if we worked long enough, 
Management Studies too could become respectable”.  
 
This small MS research group was soon about to constitute the “founding members” of JBS with Dr 
Elizabeth Garnsey (that later has decided to go back to the Engineering Department in order to 
provide direct support to engineers in running the industrialisation of their innovation), Dr Andy 
Cosh, Professor Geoff Walsham, Dr David Livesey, Professor David Watson, Colin Gill and 
Professor Eddie Anderson (See Picture Appendix 10). This group of early management researchers 
have built the MS, lobbying and negotiating for the establishment of an independent MS tripos. 
Professor Stephen Watson recalls:  
“When I became head of the MS research group in 1978, we started lobbying for a business 
school. London, Manchester and Warwick had one; other Universities were following suit. 
It seemed silly for Cambridge not to do so. The subject was becoming popular. We wanted 
to acknowledge this by offering a MS tripos separate from Engineering tripos.”  
 
In particular, in 1986, the action of Peat Marwick (from KPMG) who decided to generously endow 
a chair in MS has particularly leveraged the establishment of the discipline in Cambridge. As a 
result, Stephan Watson applied and was appointed, making him the first Professor of Management 
at either Oxford or Cambridge. Now that MS had its own professorship and tripos, the small MS 
research group started to develop and expressed the growing needs to create a business school, fully 
integrated in the University. The need for the institutionalisation of management education in 
Cambridge was also coming from industrialists. Matthew Bullock56, Chief Executive at Norwich & 
Peterborough Building Society, was working for Barclays in the 1980s and thought that “until 
Oxford and Cambridge started to teach business, university graduates would always regard industry 
as being below the professions and civil service”. He argues:  
“I was then working for Barclays, and soon realised that though people in these companies 
were very bright, they had no business training – there was not much cross-over of business 
ideas into teaching in technology subjects in the university. However a Manufacturing 
Engineering Tripos was being introduced and it included some materials about the skills 
needed to run an engineering firm (…)”.   
 
It was in this context, that Matthew Bullock was put in contact with Stephen Watson, who had 
recently become head of the MS Group within the Engineering Department. Bullock asked for 
Watson’s help in his project to institutionalise management education at Cambridge. Bullock 
commented:  
                                                 
55 “The total contract value of the Department of Engineering’s research portfolio is approximately GBP90M. One third 
of this income comes from collaboration with industry; generating knowledge for companies that can be translated into 
new and improved products and services. Since the 1970s, the Department has played a significant role in the creation 
of new companies in and around Cambridge. It is at the centre of many University initiatives to provide inspiration, 
training and support. Since 2001, staff and students founded over 20 spin-out and start-up companies with a total 
investment of over GBP50M”. 
56 Matthew Bullock was a long standing supporter of the JBS 
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“I became an early advisor, and also persuaded Barclays to fund a lectureship in 
Management. By then, I had started to lend to the technology based companies and I argued 
that the people creating these firms needed more management training.” 
 
To a large extent, the Institute for Manufacturing Management (IfM) has largely contributed to 
pushing the Engineering Department towards a Technology Management oriented strategy. 
Although it was only established in 1998, the IfM is the Department of Engineering's Management 
Division. It has a cross-disciplinary approach, bringing together expertise in management, 
technology and policy to address the full spectrum of industrial issues. The IfM’s activities take 
place within an unusual structure that integrates research and education with practical application in 
industry, via a university-owned company, IfM Education and Consultancy Services Ltd. IfM’s 
research is undertaken in close collaboration with businesses, ensuring its relevance to industrial 
needs and the rapid dissemination of new ideas and approaches. In October 1995, the IfM ran the 
first Management Engineering course. Students will spend half their time working on major projects, 
many in collaboration with industry, as well as being taught modules on advanced topics.57  
 
The most significant turnabout comes, however, from Sir Paul and Lady Judge, the key benefactors 
of the Judge Business School, whom together with a generous donation from Simon Sainsbury, 
decided to invest in management education at Cambridge58. At the time, Sir Paul Judge felt very 
concerned with the urgent need to provide management education in Cambridge. He could 
particularly acknowledge the specificity and the value of management education, as he himself 
studied in the Engineering Department at the University of Cambridge, before leaving the country 
to pursue his education at the Wharton Business School in the United-States. He remembers that he 
initially came to Cambridge to study Natural Sciences but realised he didn’t want to end as “a 
person with test tubes at a bench”. This is mainly why he “switched to Industrial Management, then 
being taught in the Engineering Department”, giving him, according to his own words “a wider 
perspective and an interest in business”. However, as his interests were shifting towards 
Management he faced the lack of management programmes in the UK. Regarding this lack of 
adequate business education in the UK, he argues: 
“Doctors and lawyers should be properly trained before they can practise but historically, in 
the UK we had not treated management as a profession (…) so I decided to go to the US 
(Wharton Business School). Returning two years later, I saw the difference between British 
and American attitudes to management. In the UK, it was seen as administration whereas in 
the US it was about strategy and managing change. (…) I offered to help”.  
 
In 1990, Sir Paul Judge gave £8 million to the University of Cambridge to found the Judge Business 
School. The University of Cambridge Judge Institute of Management Studies was at last established. 
In September 2005 the School was re-named as the Judge Business School. Simon Sainsbury also 
contributed through Monument Trust. The School is currently situated on the site of the original 
Addenbrooke's Hospital (1766) on Trumpington Street, near the University's Fitzwilliam Museum 
and is really noticeable with its colourful facade. 
 
III. Preliminary results and discussion 
 
The last section of our contribution provides a cross-case search for patterns among the two 
historical cases which have been developed in the previous section. Our research suggests two 
results which, overall, argue against the existence of a smooth process underlying the development 
of business schools. Rather, our preliminary results indicate a complex process of emergence, 
                                                 
57 IfM’s website: www.ifm.eng.cam.ac.uk/ 
58 Judge Business School (2009), “First twenty years: a celebration. Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, 
1989-2009” 
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development and institutionalisation, which was neither a conscious desire expressed by existing 
academic institutions nor the result of a clear vision provided by academic leaders at the time. This 
research confirms Weick’s idea that business schools are loose couple systems (Weick, 1976). Our 
contribution shows that the nature of business schools’ organisational change combines a series of 
exogenous and endogenous generative mechanisms, through disjointed clusters of events. 
Obviously, our results do not suggest that these generative mechanisms are universally applicable 
across all organisations in different institutional spheres (Pettigrew, 1979: 580). Yet, it is from this 
combination of exogenous and endogenous factors that future business schools’ strategies might 
emerge, in the future.  
 
- Exogenous generative mechanisms 
 
It is generally argued that it was the absence of an answer to the question “what was the University 
doing for business?” which forced Oxford and Cambridge Universities to begin some “heart-
searching about [their] hithero largely passive” involvement in management studies (Raeburn, 
1995: 5). As suggested by the historical cases presented in Section II of the paper, Oxford and 
Cambridge witnessed some major changes in their business environment and were, to a large 
extent, forced to adapt their educational programmes and research to the new needs emerging 
within the industrial community. The influence of the creation of the Cambridge Science Park on 
the institutionalisation of the future Judge Business School is significant enough. The general idea 
about management education was that in a constantly moving world, managers must be trained to 
be flexible. Consequently, teaching management also had to evolve adequately. As pointed out by 
Harrigan (1990: 697), “educators can reinforce the value of this attitude in their students, but they 
must first subscribe to this philosophy themselves. They must embrace change by adding continual 
innovation in their teaching and research efforts”. Put differently, historical trajectories followed by 
business schools from their emergence to their institutionalisation forced their academic members to 
adjust their strategies given the changes in their environment.  
 
As shown in our historical accounts, this changing world required increasing cooperation between 
Universities and industry. The publication of the Robbins report in the early 1960s led towards 
controversial open questions within the British business education system highlighted by Nick 
Tiratsoo (1999) and which, we believe, are, to a large extent, still relevant to today’s world of 
business schools. One of them “How should the new business schools be launched and run?” 
opposed, on the one hand, the defenders of collaboration with existing Universities and, on the other, 
their opponents who strongly believed that business education should be kept free from “the 
clutches of unworthy dons” and oriented towards “essentially practical goals” (Tiratsoo, 1999: 117). 
Through the creation of independent institutions such as the Oxford University Business Summer 
School or the Cambridge University Small Business Research Centre, Oxford and Cambridge got 
gradually closer to the business world before initiating management studies as an academic 
discipline. In Cambridge, Vice-Chancellor (1996-2003) Lord Broers, stressed the importance to 
teach managers how to run technology based-businesses, “arguing that Business Schools like JBS 
can do this when often companies themselves can’t.” Although the growing idea diffused in the 
1980s that “knowledge creation takes place not only in ivory towers, but also in corporate 
boardrooms” (Friga et al., 2003: 236), Oxbridge acceptance of MS was a long drawn out process of 
negotiation among the different governing bodies of the University. Often, issues identified as 
requiring strategic attention were more concerned with the way to avoid too much vocational 
education than to provide concrete tools and techniques for businesses. The Oxbridge perception of 
management studies and business education lies probably somewhere else than in the pure 
development of new techniques for businesses and somehow agrees with Spender’s suggestion that 
“management might be better understood if we take a different viewpoint – I suggest as an art form 
– possibly the most significant art form to be found in today’s complex society. Recall Simon 
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(1991) told us we are a society of organisations, not of markets, and these organisations have to be 
managed.” (Spender, 2005: 1285) 
 
The debate suggested by the Robbins report in the early 1960s also introduced two divergent views 
regarding the orientation of management teaching: the industrialists who were in favour of courses 
which could “service their immediate needs”, arguing for short post experience courses and most 
academics who were defending “one or two year MBAs, taught by a faculty which was itself 
engaged in research” (Tiratsoo, 1999: 117). Hence, the introduction of new vocational programmes 
within the Oxbridge teaching curriculum was also the result of an exogenous shock first initiated by 
the American model of Masters of Business Administrations. As pointed out by our research, the 
introduction of MBA programmes in Oxbridge raised a series of issues, and yet prior to the 
institutionalisation of both business schools, took time to be implemented (in 1990 in Cambridge 
and in 1998 in Oxford). The structure of the programmes was subject to discussion and scrutiny in 
several University reports (Moser report and Hay report) and evolved from a three to a two to a one 
year programme in Cambridge and from a two-year MBA to a one year specialist MBA in Oxford. 
To a large extent, this can be seen as a specific ability in Oxbridge to follow an evolutionary model 
which leaves behind programmes which are not sufficiently ‘performant’ over time. Both MBA 
programmes still pretend to be highly demanding as they cover in one year what many business 
schools do in two. In 2002, an article published in Oxford Today (2002) argued that “MBA students 
have an image of being loud-talking, Porsche-driving, Rolex-snapping types who cannot wait to 
pull down big bonuses in consultancy or banking”. In response to this stereotype, Anthony 
Hopwood, first MBA Director in Cambridge wanted to break the mould and argued: “Our job is to 
produce rounded and knowledgeable citizens for the 21st century, not to process stereotypes” 
(Hopwood, in Oxford Today, 2002). Interestingly, the success of MBA programs in Oxbridge were 
highly critical as it set ideals to convince the different governing bodies to create a business school. 
The future development of these programmes requires specific strategic attention, especially since 
MBA programmes recently became the basis for business schools’ rankings (see, for instance, the 
Financial Times’ ranking).      
 
Fund raising issues also emerged from the recent evolution of the business world, which has 
increasingly expressed the need for management training. Interestingly, fundraising strategies 
naturally provoke competition between Universities. The 1989 minutes of the General Board of 
Faculties in Oxford mentioned as a “relevant development” that “at the end of July, Cambridge 
announced its plans for an MBA on a much smaller basis than that proposed by the Oxford working 
party” (GBF, 1988-1989: 765). In 1988, the Planning and Development Committee noted that 
“Cambridge has estimated that it needs capital of £10m in order to launch its Institute of MS and 
MBA, and that these will be self-financing after five years. Cambridge’s situation is very different 
from Oxford’s (…) but, given what already exists at Templeton, the committee thinks it is difficult 
to see why expansion at Oxford need cost more than twice as much as that at Cambridge” (Ibid.). 
Yet, the race for fundraising and the effort of maintaining viable relations with the alumni network 
appears to be a central strategy which was not needed in more traditional departments evolving at 
the beginning of the twentieth century.  
 
Questions related to salaries and recruitment in new business schools were also considered as 
exogenous factors. Regarding this matter, John Kay argued that “it is not possible to attract 
internationally distinguished business school faculty if a newly appointed lecturer is paid less than 
£20.000 and the standard professorial salary is around £40.000 (Would you listen to a lecture on 
corporate finance or option pricing from someone earning for less than the pay of the receptionist at 
an investment bank?)” (Kay, 2000: 4). To a large extent, there is an exogenous trend that most 
schools “strive to develop and market distinctive strengths and to pre-empt their rivals in hiring new 
members of faculty or in luring away others with an established reputation” (Bolton, 1996: 494).  
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Last but not least, the recent internationalisation of academic institutions constitutes another 
challenge for business schools. Multicultural degrees as well as international research projects 
became necessary conditions in the search for maintaining or developing a future comparative 
advantage. These conditions were easily reached by Oxford and Cambridge management education, 
since both Universities have always valued a very vigorous international exposure. For instance, 
Oxford Today claimed in 2002 that the SBS MBA programme is represented by 33 nationalities and 
the School has a “higher proportion of Americans than either INSEAD or the London Business 
School”.      
 
This series of ‘exogenous shocks’ coming from business schools’ business environments forced 
them, to a large extent, to participate in management education, even in the case of anti vocational 
and traditional institutions, such as Oxford and Cambridge. To sustain a comparative advantage, 
contemporary business schools now need to equally set their priorities around four main strategic 
poles:  research, teaching, alumni networks and cooperation with industry. As pointed out in a study 
about the level of stress encountered by Deans of business schools (Bolton, 1996: 493), it is 
relevant to note that success for a business school “tends to manifest itself for the faculty in salary 
awards, recruitment of new colleagues, size of teaching load, availability of research assistants and 
funding for research, quality of students, especially PhDs and MBAs, secretarial support and 
physical facilities”. In addition to that, “not only are deans striving to satisfy the material and 
collegial needs of their faculty, they must court alumni, employers and the media to help ensure that 
the school’s reputation is continuously enhanced. This helps to ensure a virtuous circle with income 
from corporate executive teaching programmes and consultancy, from donations, with attractive 
jobs for graduating students and positive references in the press” (Ibid.). However, if these 
exogenous shocks can explain a part of the emergence of management education; they only partially 
describe the dynamics underlying its evolution. The understanding of the shape taken by research 
and teaching in business studies also results from endogenous generative mechanisms, which are 
more subjective to the context of the institution.  
 
- Endogenous generative mechanisms 
 
The historical cases explored in Section II showed that management education – beyond a response 
to exogenous factors – was an unintended ironic consequence of confusion, personal antagonism, 
vested interests, Oxford and Cambridge’s ways of building new disciplines on existing ones, 
shortage of academic staff in management, and inherited ambivalence about vocational education. 
To a large extent, these endogenous generative mechanisms explain the lateness, the peculiar 
structure, and the multidisciplinary orientation expressed by two ancient Universities in a modern 
world. In particular, we can discuss six endogenous mechanisms resulting from similar patterns 
emerging from our case studies.  
 
Firstly, the notion of time in decision-making processes is, to a certain extent, idiosyncratic to the 
Oxbridge context. We argue that the Universities’ late entrance on the market of business education 
is largely due to the University’s governing structure, as a whole. As for any other Universities, 
faculties’ desire of stability in their discipline paradigms adds “longevity to evaluation criteria from 
one cohort of faculty to the next” (Cummings, 1990: 695). Changing curriculum for individual 
faculty is often considered as inefficient “in terms of the time it takes to adjust courses significantly 
and for the composite faculty” (Ibid.). It also raised political issues “around the relative power of 
different faculty interests (e.g., behavioral and non-behavioral) implied in any major curriculum 
adjustments” and therefore implies “realignments of faculty power and influence” which tend to 
take time (Ibid.: 696). In addition and more specifically to the Oxbridge context, the crucial role 
played by the governing bodies (and their distribution across the University), by the Vice-
Chancellor and the pro Vice-Chancellors, the democratic role of Congregation which allows 
academic and administrative staff to vote for (or against) any changes, and therefore the need for a 
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series of reports documenting every step of a possible evolution tend to slow down the decision-
making process and every new initiative. The efficiency of such a governing system is not clear and 
often discussed among the academic community. John Kay’s personal experience in Oxford led him 
to argue that this governance was “a constant source – at first of incomprehension, then of 
frustration – to Mr. Saïd, who spent five years trying to persuade the University to accept a £20 
million gift” (Kay, 2000: 4). This general view about the constant frustration when trying to 
implement a new initiative in Oxford or Cambridge is not shared by everyone. In our interviews, 
many academics and administrative staff admit that when the University is facing an evolution, 
“things are not going to happen tomorrow”. As argued by one of the founders of the current 
Cambridge Centre for Business Research, “the Cambridge story indicates that it is possible to start 
from virtually nothing and achieve a critical mass, but this takes time” (Keeble, 1989). Each new 
initiative is discussed and patience is often required when one has the desire to implement a new 
idea. Interestingly though, one of the interviewees denies the impossibility of individual enterprise 
in the Oxbridge context and rather, argues that nobody in the governing bodies really has the power 
to stop an individual initiative. This second view is also defended by Anthony Hopwood who 
rightly remarked that “it was always going to be complicated here because of the sort of place 
Oxford is. It’s democratic, it’s lateral, it’s conversational” (Hopwood, in Beckett, The Independent, 
1999). This position defends the idea that people with energy, enthusiasm, conviction and views 
have the power to build a range of new institutions and Centres, as we can count so many of them in 
both Universities at the moment.  
 
These two views show that the key factor here is a good understanding of the context in which the 
business school operates. The governing structure and the time horizons illustrate a more general 
relevant organisational aspect which is a set of tacit rules, norms and conventions which govern 
business schools’ organisational change and need to be assimilated by the players who wish to 
contribute to institutional evolution. To a large extent, this is common knowledge in the Oxbridge 
context and particularly well expressed by John Kay himself regarding Oxford:  
“There was always an element of ritual, of games played according to arcane and implicit 
rules. The vast majority of participants (…) had spent much of their lives learning the 
Oxford processes, and did not recognise their peculiar and idiosyncratic nature, although 
there was a certain pride in the uniqueness of the Oxford way.” (Kay, 2000: 5) 
The author goes even further and adds that “when decisions are made, or meaningful discussions 
take place, it is often in secret and within groups with no formal status” (Ibid.: 8). Unsurprisingly, 
this tacit set of rules is the result of the history, the heritage and pattern of an organisation.  
 
As Bolton argued in his study of deans’ behaviours and roles in business schools, the leadership 
style of a business school often appears to match the culture of the institution, since working ““with 
the culture”, even whilst promoting change, has been revealed as perhaps the fundamental 
requirement for successful academic leadership” (Bolton, 1996: 499). More generally, business 
schools’ strategies of development gain to be aligned with their organisational culture. In 
particular, this is well illustrated by Lord Broers Vice Chancellor of Cambridge University (1996-
2003), who believed “in the application of technology for the benefit of mankind”, recognises that 
“successfully managing technological research and development require a special kind of 
knowledge” and is pleased “to see that the current Director of JBS, Arnoud de Meyer, is an expert 
in technology management, because that is something we really need in the UK”. That is; the case 
of the Judge Business School is particularly significant, since it represents “genuinely 
entrepreneurial, new-firm-based growth – based on computing hardware and software, scientific 
instruments and electronics, and, increasingly, biotechnology – which has spun off from university 
research on the Silicon Valley model” (Castells and Hall, 2001).  
 
Interestingly, this organisational culture is also reflected by the architectural effort made by 
Oxford and Cambridge in the institutionalisation of their respective business schools. Regarding the 
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current SBS building, Anthony Hopwood early described “how it is transforming the way the 
School works, facilitating those accidental-opportune Oxford collisions in corridors and 
quadrangles” (Oxford Today, 2002). In Oxford, the choice of architects such as Jeremy Dixon and 
Ed Jones (architects of the Royal Opera House conversion and the subtle extension of the National 
Portrait Gallery) indicates the importance given to the design of the business school59. This very 
special piece of architecture even received significant media coverage (for further details, see. 
Glancey, 2001). In Cambridge, the role of the architectural design was similar, as Simon Sainsbury, 
one of the benefactors of the JBS wanted a building that was architecturally outstanding. The JBS 
building still constitutes one of the unique attractions of the School: a colourful building that would 
stimulate imagination, creativity and innovation. 
 
Another endogenous force which is emerging from our historical cases is the disjoined nature of the 
evolution of management education at Oxbridge. As shown in Section II of our contribution, the 
institutionalisation process of the SBS and the JBS experienced periods of expansion of 
management education, separated by long intervals of obstinate hostility towards business education 
and internal conflicts of interests between academics and decision-makers. Overall, the 
institutionalisation of business schools resulted in the (gradual) imposition of a solution by a small 
minority of interests. This endogenous factor is closely related to the concept of subsequent dramas 
developed by Pettigrew in 1979. As argued by the author, “the point of studying a sequence of 
social dramas longitudinally is that they provide a transparent look at the growth, evolution, 
transformation, and conceivably, decay of an organisation over time” (Pettigrew, 1979: 570). The 
series of social dramas outlined in Section II (especially in the context of Oxford) is therefore 
significant, as we argued that “each of these dramas was sufficiently engaging of the minds and 
actions of the people in the school to be regarded as critical events” and consequently, it is not just 
“the researcher’s judgment which pinpoints the social dramas” (Ibid.: 571). To a large extent though, 
the existence of internal conflicts seems to apply to other business schools as Bolton remarked “the 
introduction of new recruits to a school otherwise dominated by longer-established members 
presented a leader with difficulties. This was especially the case if there was a tendency to divide 
into two camps: one teaching-orientated, older, loyal to the school; the other research-orientated, 
younger, driven by the need for individual achievement” (Bolton, 1996: 498). The resolution of 
these conflicts of interest is one of the key factors of the institutionalisation of business schools, and 
yet has to be seen as details of a School’s evolution which should dedicate its resources in more 
strategic assets. The strategic line of orientation should remain a priority for the school.  According 
to Kay, the very own nature of the governance structure of Oxford University leads to the resolution 
of contested issues which “can be postponed for many years by avoiding discussion, by deferral, by 
ambiguity, by referral to other committees, and by other forms of procrastination. But eventually 
these devices run out. If a small group of people is sufficiently persistent, it stands a good chance of 
getting what it wants, after a long delay. This is true however small the group and however weak 
the merits of its case” (Kay, 2000: 3). This remark strengthens the idea of democracy in the 
decision-making processes.  
 
Last but not least, the whole paradox is to find the right balance between making sure that 
Management exists as an independent academic discipline from other social sciences and yet; is 
able to use and collaborate with other disciplines in order to enrich management from other 
approaches/ paradigms. This issue was already raised by the Robbins report when it was time to 
decide the content of the courses in management and lead to disagreement about the range of 
subjects that should be taught: “some valued the importance of economics and accountancy, while 
other insisted on integrating other social sciences, as psychology and sociology” (Tiratsoo, 1999: 
                                                 
59 Interestingly, a relevant comparison with the designing of the Social Studies building in Manor Road that same year 
could be made. As one of the interviewees noted, the difference of attitudes was significant: while the Business School 
was selecting the best Italian stones to put in the entrance of the building, for the department of Economics, “as long as 
people had computers, rooms to sit in which were not uncomfortable, that was fine”.     
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117). The Oxbridge context showed us two different disciplinary trajectories. Unquestionably, the 
current orientation of management education in Cambridge results from a long tradition of 
Technology Management and has been mainly constructed through the Engineering Department. 
Yet, as argued by Professor Robert Mair (Chairman of the Faculty Board of Business and 
Management in Cambridge):  
“The school has become more integrated with the University as a whole. Interdisciplinary 
has always been encouraged in Cambridge, but the links between the school and different 
departments have become much stronger. A number of programmes now involve lecturers 
from across University, with experience in a wide variety of fields, alongside business 
school faculty. And the school hosts several collaborative research group, for example, is a 
joint initiative with the Faculty of Economics, while the Cambridge Center for Energy 
studies involves colleagues of mine from engineering. These links put JBS at the heart of the 
University’s teaching and research”  
This interdisciplinary orientation of the discipline is also expressed by the interest of the school in 
targeting different industry activities such as hospitals, science-based firms and consultancy 
companies60.  
Regarding the content of the first MS degree in Oxford, institutional endogenous factors have also 
been seen as decisive. At first sight, looking at the content of the first course in MS held at Oxford 
University, it could be argued that the field was very much multidisciplinary, mixing a range of 
social science topics (Arena, 2009). However, our analysis has shown that this multidisciplinarity 
was not really consciously constructed arose from a shortage of suitable resources, as well as the 
ambivalence of the University about management education. Consequently, this unconscious choice 
of multidisciplinarity made further overlapping research between sub-disciplines even more 
difficult. Unsurprisingly then, this interdisciplinary desire is still expressed by the Oxford 
University business school which is “aiming to transcend the traditional functional divisions of a 
business school in order to reflect the complex realities of business and society in today’s global 
economy”61. As Anthony Hopwood remarked “most major European business schools are stand-
alone institutions” and the SBS involvement “with the wider university means that we can build on 
links with scientists, lawyers and others, which is much harder for places like London Business 
School, Insead or IMD” (Hopwood, in Beckett, 1999). In a subsequent interview Hopwood 
remarked that although “its almost filial relationship with Oxford economics, the Saïd is pursuing 
close links in areas such as psychology, history, politics and international relations” (Oxford Today, 
2002) 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
The overall purpose of this contribution has been to highlight some generative mechanisms 
underlying the dynamics of evolution of business schools, as organisations. Supported by two 
historical case studies, our research shows that the institutionalisation and development of business 
schools are not the result of a steady evolution, but rather of a disjointed cluster of events. This 
series of unplanned events and unintended consequences is not purely contextual and is partially 
explained by forces exogenous to the organisation which force business schools to adapt rapidly 
over time. As stressed by our contribution, these exogenous forces result in a constantly changing 
business world which leads to the existence of a proper market for management education. Through 
the two historical case studies, this contribution suggests three different strategic periods which 
coincide with three different levels of combinations of exogenous and endogenous mechanisms. 
The first one which roughly corresponds to an extension of what G.L.S. Shackle called the ‘years of 
high theory’ covers the period 1900s-1950s. During this period, academics in the UK were mainly 
                                                 
60 For example, Professor Stefan Scholtes has helped to develop a typically interdisciplinary programme among the 
executive courses at JBS, for senior health leaders and hospital managers in conjunction with Cambridge University 
Hospital NHS Foundation trust.  
61 Said Business School’s Website (2009).  
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driven by endogenous forces as their priority was to develop rigorous economic theories in ivory 
towers, yet not necessarily applied to the business world. The exogenous factors of evolution were 
almost inexistent. The publication of successive reports on University education at the beginning of 
the 1960s modified this dynamics and put a stronger strategic attention on the teaching aspects of 
economics and management at University. Then, this opens a second period of interest (1960s-
1980s) which is explained more equally by exogenous and endogenous factors. It is from the 
(exogenous) increasing need for business training that (endogenous) debates started flourishing 
about the need for management education within Universities’ programmes. The most recent period 
(1980s-2010s) of business schools’ evolution constitutes a set of strategies mainly driven by 
exogenous forces expressed by the business world. These forces became powerful enough to 
outweigh the remaining hostility towards management education at Oxbridge. However, to a large 
extent, our preliminary results converge towards and complement JC Spender’s recent view that, 
today, the value of business schools tend to rather lie in what they “do” than in what they “know”, 
in their “credentialing activity” rather than in their “research” (Spender, 2005: 1289). In agreement 
with this view, it is therefore relevant to argue that “how and why, and for how long we can sustain 
this is a matter of speculation, perhaps an area of management we have not yet dared research” 
(Ibid.: 1290).  
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Abbreviations…  
 
 
CBR  : Centre for Business Research 
ESRC  : Economic and Social Research Council 
FME  : Foundation for Management Education 
GBF   : General Board of Faculties 
JBS  : Judge Business School 
MS  : MS 
MT, HT, TT : Michaelmas Term, Hilary Term, Trinity Term (Oxford) 
MT, LT, ET : Michaelmas Term, Lent Term, Easter Term (Cambridge) 
NEDC  : National Economic Development Council 
OCMS  : Oxford Centre for MS 
OMSA  : Oxford MS Archives 
SBS  : Saïd Business School 
TC  : Templeton College 
 
 
… and brief glossary of the Oxbridge jargon 
 
 
- Cambridge University Reporter: Official and authorised journal of record of the University of Cambridge. 
The Reporter is issued weekly on Wednesdays during Full Term. It provides its reader information regarding 
notices of all University business – announcing University events, proposals for changes in regulations, 
Council and General Board decisions, as well as information on awards, scholarships and appointments. 
 
- Chancellor: University formal head who is more of a titular figure than someone involved in a day-to-day 
running of University affairs.  
 
- Congregation: This governing body, also often called the “parliament of the dons” includes members of 
the University’s academic and administrative staff. It has ultimate responsibility for legislative matters and 
discusses on policies proposed by the University Council. Oxford and Cambridge, in a similar structure, are 
unique for this democratic form of governance.  
 
- Convocation: Body which comprises all graduates of the University. Members of the Convocation elect 
the University Chancellor.   
 
- Council of the University: Executive policy-forming body, which consists of the Vice-Chancellor as well 
as heads of departments and other members elected by Congregation, in addition to observers from the 
Student Union. 
 
- General Boards of Faculties: Bodies responsible for the academic and educational policy of the 
University. 
 
- Oxford University Gazette: Official and authorised journal of record of the University of Oxford. Its 
weekly issues, from September to July, throughout the academic year have been published since 1870 and 
only put online since 1990. The Gazette provides its reader information regarding Oxford University, such as 
lists of events and lectures, the official announcements, the newly appointed professors, or the available 
vacancies. 
 
- Royal Charter: A royal charter made an institution into an independent college of the University. The only 
two universities in the UK that had this possibility were Oxford and Cambridge. 
- Tripos: The Tripos refer to the degree courses given at the University of Cambridge. The term ‘Tripos’ 
goes back to the seventeenth century when verses would be read out by someone sat on a three-legged stool 
(or Tripos) at graduation ceremonies. These became known as the Tripos verses. Eventually ‘Tripos’ was 
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used to refer to courses offered by the University, when the lists of graduating students for each subject were 
written on the back of the Tripos verses. A Tripos is divided into two parts: Part I, which is broadly based, 
and Part II, which allows specialization within the student's chosen field. 
- University Calendar:   
 Cambridge Oxford 
First Term Michaelmas  Term  Michaelmas Term 
Second Term Lent Term  Hilary Term 
Third Term  Easter Term  Trinity Term 
 
- Vice-chancellor: Head of the University, who unlike the Vice-chancellor, deals with the day-to-day 
business of the University. In Oxford, five Pro-Vice-Chancellors have specific responsibilities for Education; 
Research; Planning and Resources; Development and External Affairs; and Personnel and Equal 
Opportunities. 
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Appendix 1: Evolution of MS in Oxford over the 20th Century 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2: Evolution of MS in Cambridge over the 20th Century 
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Appendix 3: Letter from J.W. Platt to the Oxford Registrar, 17th January 1961, (OMSA, File 1) 
 
Dear Registar, 
 
I shall be grateful if you will convey to the Vice-Chancellor a financial offer to Oxford University, which 
arises out of a luncheon held in St Anthony’s College on 3rd December 1960, at which the Vice-Chancellor 
and several University personalities interested in MS were present. This offer comes from the McKinsey 
Foundation for Management Research in the United States, which is an educational trust founded by the 
prominent firm of Management Consultants, McKinsey & Company Inc. 
The Trust is willing to put at the disposal of Oxford University a sum of $10.000, to be used to finance a 
report on the possibilities of developing MS at Oxford. It has been felt that in view of the diversity of 
opinions on this subject, Oxford University might wish to make their own careful appraisal of the 
possibilities and problems of introducing MS at the University, before they are officially initiated.  
Although I am authorised to convey this offer to Oxford, I am sure you will understand that the formalities of 
this educational Trust will have to be observed, i.e., they will require a formal proposal which has to be 
submitted for the approval of the Trustees. 
I am not fully familiar with Oxford procedure in these matters, and if you wish to talk this over me, I shall be 
happy to come up to Oxford on some mutually convenient date.  
 
Yours truly, James W. Platt. 
 
Appendix 4: Letter from Mr. Wright to the Chairman of the Board on MS, Professor Hicks, 25 May 
1961, (OMSA, File 1) 
 
As I see it, there are two major questions to be answered. The first is: ‘Is there, within the general field of 
MS, a substantial and unified collection of subjects that is also academically respectable when judged by our 
Oxford standards?’ The second is ‘What type and scale of facilities would have to be provided if these 
studies were introduced here?’ 
Before the Committee and university can answer these, it ought to be provided with answers to questions of 
the kind listed below. The list is not intended to be comprehensive, and there is inevitable over-lapping.  
A. Questions relevant to ‘academic respectability’ to be asked about individual management subjects: 
1. Can the teachers of the subject indulge in genuine academic research? Do they do so? 
2. Would their interests cross-fertilize with those of present members of the University? 
3. Is the subject is ‘genuine’ is it large enough and sufficiently well provided with books to be taught 
and examined in the Oxford manner? i.e. is it well enough developed for examiners to be able to set 
papers which do not degenerate into requests for the performance of a limited repertoire of model 
answers? 
4. What sort of intellectual sprit does the subject foster amongst those who study it? 
 
B. Questions relevant to facilities to be asked about particular subject and also about possible courses 
(programmes’ in American):  
1. Can the subjects be taught on a tutorial/lecture system or do they need the provision of more 
continuous classes and seminars? 
2. Do these or other factors set an economic minimum to the scale of the course to be provided? 
3. To what extent would the appointment of specialists be necessary? 
4. Could the subject be organized within the system of colleges and existing institutions? 
I believe that it is only by finding out the answers to lesser questions of this kind that we can give an answer 
to the greater. These lesser questions themselves are not all matters on which one man can come to definite 
conclusions, but they are matters on which a good deal of quite intensive detailed investigations would need 
to be made. One wants to see the subjects being taught, to see the work that is produced, and have plenty of 
time to absorb the intellectual atmosphere. I hope that about six weeks would be long enough to do this in a 
few US business schools selected for their quality and their contrast: Harvard, MIT, Columbia, Carnegie 
Tech., Cornell, and possibly Chicago.  
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Appendix 5: Oxford Centre for MS – Pamphlet - 1970 
 
SENIOR MANAGERS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME – 1970 
-  (1) Quantitative Methods (C.A. Rands):  
Statistical Analysis: The Theory of Sampling and Hypothesis Testing; Regression Analysis. 
Applied Probability: Quality control, Decision theory, Forecasting, Stock control. 
General: Network Analysis, Linear Programming, Systems Theory, Simulation.  
The Quantitative Methods seminars are designed to develop the manager’s awareness of how mathematics 
can help him in decision-making. They demonstrate the manner in which problems may be analysed, and 
mathematics applied to provide a feasible solution. The aim is to enable a manager to use an O.R. or systems 
department to its full potential. 
- (2) Managerial Economics (N.H. Leyland): 
Costs. Profit. Price Determination. Types of Competition. Monopoly Problems. Problems of Growth.  
Managerial Economics is the application of economic concepts to management problems. The purpose of 
this group of subjects is to develop the manager’s awareness of his problems by examining them from the 
point of view of an outside analytical observer.  
- (3) Government-Industry Relations (N.H. Leyland): 
National Planning and the Control of the Economy. Inflation. Balance of Payments. Fiscal Policy. Merger 
and Monopoly Policies.  
In the seminars the managers are given an insight into modern economic theories. The relations between the 
environment, government and the firm are explored. 
- (4) Industrial Sociology (A.Fox): 
The Nature of an Industrial Organisation. Role Theory. Power, Authority and Status, Channels of 
Distribution. Behaviour Systems. Motivation. Changing Organisational Behaviour.   
The course begins by examining the variety of men’s attitudes to work and the causes of the differences. 
What are the consequences at the different levels of the organisation in terms of co-operation and conflict? 
This involves a study of the social structure of the enterprise in respect of work roles and rewards, power and 
authority, group values and attitudes, and communications. The causes of conflict are further explored, along 
with the implications for management strategy.  
- (5) Industrial Relations and Personnel Management (Dr. W.E.J. McCarthy): 
Relations with Trade Unions. Collective Bargaining. Disputes Procedures. Wage Structures. Systems of 
Wage Payment. Problems of Manpower Utilisation. Personnel Selection. Management Development and 
Appraisal.  
Managers are given an appreciation of what is necessary for the development and application of effective 
industrial relations and personnel policy. The focus throughout is on the problems of the firm and different 
levels of management within the firm. The central aim is to provide the basis of analysis for more effective 
use of manpower resources. 
- (6) Marketing (H.R. Windle): 
Organisation. Marketing Analysis. Market Research. Sales Forecasting. Technological Forecasting. 
International Forecasting. Product Planning. Channels of Distribution. Selling. Sales Promotion. Advertising. 
Pricing.  
Marketing is viewed as an adaptive process enabling the enterprise, within its total Corporate Strategy, to 
adjust continually to the changes in its markets and technologies. Special emphases include the increasing 
pressure towards an international view of markets and problems of organizing for effective marketing action. 
- (7) Organisation (Rosemary Stewart): 
Ways of looking at Organisations: The tasks of organisation – division of work, grouping, co-ordination. 
Some problems of organisation – those of relationships, of balance and of change.  
The aim is to show the manager why it is worth thinking about organisation; to help him to know when his 
problem is an organisational one and what kind of organisational problem it is. The seminars focus on 
different organisational decisions that must be made, and on some of the most common organisational 
problems that arise. 
- (8) Finance and Investment (A.H. Vause): 
Accounting Concepts. Profit Determination. Funds Flow. Provision of Capital. Investment Appraisal. 
Mergers and Acquisitions. Portfolio Inverstment.  
The seminars attempt to give an understanding of the underlying concepts of finance and the ability to use 
and interpret financial data.  
- (9) Management Information (A.H. Vause): 
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Budgeting. Costing. Planning and Control. Measurement of Managerial Performance. Cost Effectiveness. 
Impact of Information Systems. Information for Decision-making. 
This section of the programme starts by surveying information and investment control systems; then it 
concentrates on the adaptation of this to the manager’s own decision-making situation, enabling him to get 
the maximum benefit from the flow of accounting information within his own organisation. 
- (10) Business Policy (N.H.Leyland): 
Corporate Planning. Long-range Forecasting. Reconciliation of Objectives.  
The purpose of this seminar is to consider the business as a whole in relation to its environment and to 
discuss the appropriate methods for the firm to adapt to its environment.         
 
Appendix 6: Major recommendations of the Moser Report (Oxford University General Board of 
faculties, 1988) 
(a)  “That there should be an Oxford University School of Management responsible for all Management 
education within the University (possible involving a change of status of TC); 
(b) that a number of faculties should establish bipartite or multipartite undergraduate courses in which 
Management-related subjects occupy a significant part of the course; 
(c) that a full-time, two-year MBA course should be introduced consisting of a “generalist” first year 
and a “specialist” second year – students with the appropriate qualifications would be entitled to 
exemption from the generalist year and would proceed immediately to the specialist year; 
(d) that students should have the option of part-time study for the MBA; 
(e) that a full-time, three-year doctoral programme should be introduced of which the first year should 
consist of research training, to be followed by two years of research; 
(f) that the University should approve an increase in overall undergraduate and graduate student 
numbers to allow for the proposed development of MS  
(Extract from the General Board of the Faculties, Hebdomadal Council, Vol. CLXXIX, 20 April 1988: 39) 
 
Appendix 7: Letter to the Chairman of the General Board from the Chairman [Donald Hay] of the 
working party (Oxford University General Board of faculties, 1989) 
 
The Working Party has now completed its task, and the Report has been submitted.  
We have interpreted our brief to include design of an academic programme (and particularly an MBA) that 
accords with Oxford’s traditions of international academic excellence, and the exploration of the financial 
implications of that programme. In making our proposals, we have been greatly influenced by the need to 
compete with the leading Schools of Management in terms of both staff and students. (…) we believe that 
the proposals represent the best way forward: institutional difficulties should be regarded as matters to be 
resolved rather than as inseparable obstacles to the whole scheme. Many of these difficulties could be 
avoided by creating a School of Management with only minor links to the rest of the University (e.g. if all 
MBA students were matriculated through Templeton). But we believe that in the long run both the 
University and the School of Management would be the losers from such an arrangement. Integration of the 
School into the life of the University should be accorded a high priority.  
The Working Party also considered timing, in respect of fund raising. We are aware that both the London 
Business School and Cambridge University will be making major fundraising initiatives for management 
education in 1990. Unless Oxford can act quickly, we may find that potential benefactors have been lured 
elsewhere. A key to acting quickly in this field is the appointment of the Dean or Director of the School to 
spearhead a fundraising effort, once a decision has been taken in principle to go ahead, and without waiting 
for all the details to be agreed across the University. Such an appointment should be made no later than June 
1990, as a signal to potential donors that we are committed to the creation of a major School of Management 
at Oxford within a relatively short time period. 
 
(Signed) Donald Hay 
(Extract from the General Board of the Faculties, Hebdomadal Council, 1989: 772)    
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Appendix 8: The Hi-Tech Start-ups associated with the Cambridge University (Copyright: Y.M.Myint 
and Dr. Shailendra Vyakarnam, CfEL, Judge Business School) 
 
 
Appendix 9: MS Tripos in Cambridge (Within the Department of Engineering tripos) 1998 
Lectures proposed by the Board of the Faculty of Engineering 
ENGINEERING TRIPOS, PART IA MICHAELMAS 1998 / LENT 1999 / EASTER 1999 
PART II (continued): MS TRIPOS 
Paper M 1(Organisational behaviour) (Sixteen lectures)  
Leader: A.N. Other: DR N.OLIVER AND DR A.D. BROWN  
Paper M2 (Quantitative methods)  
Leader: Dr  C.W. Hope : DR C.W. HOPE AND DR I. RUDY  
Paper M3 (Economics offirms and markets) (Sixteen lectures)  
Leader:Dr J.Collier : DR G. HODGSON, DR J.COLLIER, DR A.D. COSH AND DR C. PITELIS  
Paper M4 (Finance management accounting) Details to be announced (Sixteen lectures)  
Paper M5 (Operations management) Details to be accounted (Sixteen lectures)  
Paper M6 (Marketing) A.N. OTHER  
Paper M7 (International HRM) Details to be announced (Sixteen lectures)  
Paper M8 (Management Science)  
DR F. VANDERBECK (Sixteen lectures)  
Paper M9 (International business economics)  
DR C. PITELIS  
Paper M10 (Corporate finance)  
DR B.LAMBRECHT (Sixteen lectures)  
Paper M11 (Information systems)  
DR J.ALLEN AND DR I.RUDY (Sixteen lectures)  
Paper M12 (Strategic management) 
DR J. HENDRY (Sixteen lectures)  
MS TRIPOS (A detailed timetable will be displayed in the Department) Lectures in LT1,Judge Institute 
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Appendix 10: The early days of MS in Cambridge: The MS research group members constitute the actual 
“founding members” of JBS with Dr Elizabeth Garnsey, Dr Andy Cosh, Professor Geoff Walsham, Dr David 
Livesey, Professor David Watson, Colin Gill and Professor Eddie Anderson. 
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